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VI. Summary, Analysis, and Conclusions.
A. DISPARITIES BETWEEN CANADIAN AND U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION AND THE HARMONIZING EFFECT OF NAFTA OR TRIPS.
1. Copyright Law.
2. Patent Law.
3. Trade Secret Law.
4. Trademark Law.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS.
I. Introduction.
Canada and the United States are each other's largest trading partners and have
many cultural similarities.1 Trade relations between the United States and Canada, how-
ever, also have many parallels between the United States and developing nations. The
net import and export of intellectual property are in opposite directions. Canada is a
net importer of intellectual property from the United States,2 while the United States
See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights, Table 6,
U.S. Total Exports to Individual Countries, 1991-98 (visited Sept. 18, 1999), http://www.
ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H198t06.txt and Table 7, U.S. Total Imports from
Individual Countries, Table 7, 1991-98, http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/
H198t07.txt (in 1998, America's imports to and exports from Canada exceeded the total
imports and exports to and from all other countries in the western hemisphere combined)
[hereinafter Highlights].
2. See Allen Z. Hertz, NAFTA Revisited: Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA,
Investment Protection Agreements and at the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261,
304 n. 197 (1997) (citing reports from Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada and the
Canadian Intellectual Property Office that patent registration by Canadian and American
inventors were 10 percent and 50 percent, respectively); id. at 307 (the United States pro-
duces 94 percent and 75 percent of the films and television shows seen in Canada); id.
at 308 ("Canada is the largest export market for U.S. books which are [79 percent] of all
book imports [into Canada].. . "); John Baldwin, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Micro-
Economics Analysis Division, Statistics Canada (visited Sept. 19, 1999), http://www.statcan.ca/
Daily/English/970317/d970317.htm#ART3 (only a small percentage of Canadian-owned man-
ufacturing firms use trademarks (11 percent), trade secrets (8.3 percent), and patents (7.1
percent)).
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is a net exporter.3 The United States has a growing trade deficit with Canada.' Canada
and the United States had different priorities when negotiating the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).' For Canada, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
secured access to the U.S. market in 1988.6 Continued access to that market while pre-
serving Canada's cultural identity and obtaining U.S. national treatment were important
negotiating points.7 For the United States, provisions to ensure intellectual property pro-
tection and their enforcement were key points.' The same issues were negotiated for the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). 9
As the United States shifts from a manufacturing-based to a knowledge-based econ-
omy, protecting intellectual property rights through international agreements takes on
increasing importance."0 NAFTA and TRIPS are hailed as major advances in international
intellectual property protection. Both treaties are subject to state dispute settlement pro-
ceedings with compulsory third-party arbitration, a final ruling requiring compliance,
and procedures to enforce decisions." International dispute resolution mechanisms are
important last resorts to address treaty violations under NAFTA and TRIPS that were
absent in previous treaties. The routine enforcement of treaty obligations, however, falls
to each country's judicial system.
3. See Highlights, supra note 1, Table 2, U.S. Trade in Services by Major Category, 1975-98,
http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otealusfthaggregate/H198tO2.txt (the net balance for U.S.
royalties and license fees exports in 1998 was $25.5 billion worldwide, up 52 percent from
1993).
4. See Trade Surplus Just Keeps Rising, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 20, 1999 (the U.S. trade deficit
with Canada is at a record $24.6 billion (U.S.)).
5. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept.
6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289, 297 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
6. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter FTA];
Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A
Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 443 (1990) (for a minor loosening in the
regulation of foreign direct investment, Canada secured investment access to the United
States).
7. See Hertz, supra note 2, at 310; Eileen McMahon, NAFTA and the Biotechnology Industry, 33
CAL. W. L. REV. 31, 31-32 (1996) (under article 1703(1), each Party must treat foreigners no
worse than its own nationals in protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights).
8. See Joseph S. Papovich, NAFTA's Provisions Regarding Intellectual Property: Are They Working
as Intended?, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253, 254-55 (1997) (recounting the negotiations for intellectual
property rights provisions in NAFTA); McMahon, supra note 7, at 31 (same).
9. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994), in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex IC (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Papovich, supra note 8, at 254.
10. See Gregory J. Maier, High-Tech Economy Is Propelled by IP, 21 NAT'L L.J. B10 (1999).
11. See Hertz, supra note 2, at 267; Papovich, supra note 8, at 255; NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 20,
section B; TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 64 (dispute settlement).
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The extent to which NAFTA and TRIPS protect intellectual property rights ulti-
mately depends on how they are codified and then enforced by the parties. 2 Statutes
are interpreted by courts against a background of prior case law, current political atmo-
sphere, and long-standing cultural influences. A treaty's impact becomes clear only after
being interpreted by each nation's law making and judicial system. Given the trade vol-
ume between the two nations, analyzing America's and Canada's implementation and
interpretation of the NAFTA and TRIPS agreements is important in its own right. This
analysis also provides insights into the differences in protections likely to arise between
the United States and developing nations making similar agreements.
As shown below, despite similarly worded statutes purporting adherence to the
NAFTA and TRIPS treaties, the scope of protection and enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights differs substantially between Canada and the United States. I have investigated
selected areas where significant disparities in protection exist in the four major cate-
gories of intellectual property law. Part II looks at copyright protection for databases
and sound recordings, moral rights, and the fair use defense. Part III examines patent
protection for life forms and compulsory licensing for drugs. Part IV compares trade
secret protections for data submitted to government agencies for obtaining approval to
market drugs. Part V considers trademark protection for well-known marks. These are
all the areas recently addressed by statutory revisions or interpretations by courts in one
or both countries. My focus is to determine the basis for disparities and the harmonizing
effect of the NAFTA and TRIPS agreements, if any. Each part surveys the pertinent pro-
visions in NAFTA and TRIPS, statutory changes in intellectual property law, and courts'
interpretations of their nation's treaty obligations. In Part VI, I summarize the forego-
ing analysis and the implications for future international treaties designed to enforce
intellectual property rights.
II. Copyright Law.' 3
A. DATABASE PROTECTION.
1. NAFTA.
NAFTA protects works described in Article 2 of the Berne Convention, "includ-
ing any other works that embody original expression ..."14 Article 2(1) of the Berne
12. See Sharon L. Goolsby, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights under NAFTA, 4 NAFTA L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 5, 92 (1998) (NAFTA's provisions are ambiguous enough to allow any Party
to avoid protecting intellectual property rights while apparently complying with the treaty).
13. See generally Kimberly Hancock, Canadian Copyright Act Revisions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
517 (1998); Sunny Handa, A Review of Canada's International Copyright Obligations, 42
McGILL L.J. 961 (1997); Bob H. Sotiriadis, A Summary of Some Distinctions between Canadian
and American Copyright Law and Practice (visited Sept. 2, 1999), http://www.robic.ca
/publications/228.htm (material delivered in a lecture to during the annual meeting of the
Section of Intellectual Property of the American Bar Association on August 1, 1998).
14. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1705(l); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, completed Paris, May 4, 1896, last revised Paris, July 24, 1971,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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Convention "includels] every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression ... -," NAFTA extends protection
to "compilations of data ... which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their
contents constitute intellectual creations ....,,6 But "protection . . . shall not extend to
the data or material itself, or prejudice any copyright subsisting in that data or mate-
rial." 7
2. TRIPS.
Article 10(2) of TRIPS specifically protects compilations of data, using nearly iden-
tical language as NAFTA.' 8
3. United States.
a. Statutory Law.
The United States made no major changes in its laws covering copyright subject
matter to comply with NAFTA or TRIPS. 9 Section 102 of the U.S. Copyright Act defines
the scope of subject matter protected as "original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression ....- 20 Ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles or discoveries cannot be copyrighted. 21 Compilations are
included as proper subject matter, but "only to the material contributed ... as distin-
guished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material.' '22 Compilations are "formed by the collec-
tion and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or
arranged in such a way that the [result] ... constitutes an original work ....23
b. Judicial Interpretations.
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the U.S. Constitution mandates originality as a prerequisite for copyright pro-
tection. 24 From Section 103 of the Copyright Act, the Court derived a three-element
15. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1).
16. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1705(1)(a-b).
17. Id.
18. "Compilations of data ... by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents ...
shall be protected ... [Pjrotection ... shall not extend to the data or material itself... 
see TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 10(2).
19. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 55.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) [hereinafter Copyright Act]. Fixation occurs when the work is
"sufficiently permanent ... to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated
Id. § 101.
21. Id. § 102(b).
22. Id. § 103(b).
23. Id. § 101.
24. 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
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test for compilations to be copyrightable: (1) collection and assembly of preexisting
material, facts, or data; (2) selection, coordination, or arrangement of the material; and
(3) creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an
"original" work of authorship.25
The Court concluded that although facts in a compilation may not be copyrighted,
the choice and arrangement of those facts may be.26 Therefore, copyright extends only
to the original components of a compilation made by the compiler.27 The Court rejected
allowing a copyright because of the amount of work done by the compiler. Such a
"sweat of the brow" rationale would extend copyright protection of compilations to the
facts themselves.2 Allowing facts to be copyrighted would unreasonably require each
new compiler to start from scratch because they would be precluded from relying on a
previous compilation. 29 Nevertheless, there is increasing pressure on the United States to
increase protection for database owners. U.S. database owners have lobbied the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for international treaty protections similar





Section 5(1) of the Copyright Act provides that copyright shall subsist in an exclu-
sive list of "every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work' '3 2 As a result
of NAFTA, the Canadian Copyright Act was amended to expressly include compila-
tions as covered works.3" Original literary works "include[s] every original production
in the literary, scientific or artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression."34 Compilations are defined as resulting from the selection or arrangement
of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, or the selection or arrangement of data.3"
Unlike the U.S. copyright law, however, there is no express restriction on protecting only
those aspects of the compilation uniquely added by the compiler.
25. Id. at 357.
26. Id. at 348.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 353.
29. Id. at 359.
30. See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 340 (1997).
31. The Act proposes fifteen years of protection for "all or a substantial part ... of a collection
of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment
of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the actual or potential
market of that other person ... " H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402 (1999).
32. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30 (1985), § 5(1) (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Copyright
Act] (visited Jan. 11, 2000), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/C/C-42.html.
33. Id. §25.
34. Id. § 2.
35. Id.
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b. Judicial Interpretations.
Traditionally, courts viewed the Canadian Copyright Act as created for the sole
objective of benefiting the authors of covered works. 6 Copyright protection serves to
encourage disclosure to advance learning and to reward and protect an author's intellec-
tual efforts.37 As late as 1995, an author's "sweat of the brow" industriousness was enough
to make a work copyrightable. 38 NAFTA, however, prompted courts to reject industri-
ousness as grounds for copyrightability. For example, in Tele-Direct Inc. v. American Bus.
Inform., the Federal Court of Appeals upheld a ruling that a compilation devoid of cre-
ativity was not protected under copyright law.39 Because compilations were added to the
Copyright Act for the purpose of implementing NAFTA, the court sought guidance from
the wording of NAFTA article 1705(1).' 0
The court noted that Article 1701(1) refers to protecting "original expressions" and
Article 1705(1)(b) to compilations constituting "intellectual creations." The court con-
cluded that in signing and implementing NAFTA, Parliament intended courts to adopt
a creativity requirement for protected works.41 In dicta, the court also approved of look-
ing to authoritative decisions from U.S. courts for aid in interpreting Canadian statutes
implementing NAFTA, when the statute's wording closely tracks a U.S. statute.42 Thus,
NAFTA appears to have swayed the Canadian judiciary to adopt a view of copyright pro-
tection for databases that matches the holding in Feist. Ironically, this occurs at a time
when the United States may expand database protection beyond Feist, if the Collections
of Information Antipiracy Act is passed.43
B. SOUND RECORDINGS.
1. NA F TA.
NAFTA requires parties to adopt the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conven-
tion.4 The producer of a sound recording has the right to: control; direct or indirect
36. See, e.g., Bishop v. Stevens [19901 31 C.P.R. (3d) 394, 403 (S.C.C.).
37. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd. [1986] 28 D.L.R. (4th) 178, 213
(F.C.T.D.); aff'd 18 C.P.R.(3d) 129 (F.C.A.); aff'd 30 C.P.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
38. See U & R Tax Services Ltd. v. H&R Block Canada, Inc. [1995] 62 C.P.R. (3d) 257, 264
(F.C.T.D.) (copyright subsists in a compilation where sufficient labor or time has been
expended).
39. [1997] 76 C.P.R. (3d) 296, 308 (F.C.A.); aff'd [1998] Can. S.C.R. LEXIS 373.
40. Id. at 303.
41. Id. at 304.
42. Id. at 304. nn.8-9.
43. A point of irony not lost on the Canadian judiciary. See Hager v. ECW Press Ltd. [1998] 85
C.P.R. (3d) 289, 309, 309 n.9 (Judge Reed noting the U.S. debate over Fiest signaling a change
in database protection, and efforts to enact legislation that would overrule the holding).
44. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 26-27. Under the Geneva Convention, producers of phono-
grams are protected from unauthorized duplication, importation, and distribution to the
public. See also Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S.
67.
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reproductions or sound recordings; the importing of unauthorized recordings; the first
public distribution of the original and copies of recordings by sale, rental or other-
wise; and the commercial rental of recordings, unless otherwise allowed by contractual
agreement between the producer and the author.4"
Producer's rights are limited only for "special cases that do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the sound recording and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder."46 Under NAFTAs cultural industries exception,' 7 however,
parties have no obligations for cultural industries, as defined in NAFTA article 2107,
including NAFTA's intellectual property provisions.48 In addition, the protection given
to foreign performers are limited by national reciprocity principles.49 This differs from




By incorporating the Berne Convention, TRIPS gives authors of literary and artistic
works the exclusive right to allow reproduction of their works in any manner or form.5'
Article 14 gives the producers of phonograms the right to prevent the unauthorized
reproduction of sound recordings and broadcasters the right to prevent the unauthorized
broadcasting of a performance to the public. 5 2 Similar to NAFTA, TRIPS gives produc-
ers the right to authorize or prohibit direct or indirect reproductions.5 3 TRIPS, how-
ever, has no cultural industries exception.54 While TRIPS, like NAFTA, requires national
treatment as the general rule, an exception was created for performers and produc-
ers of phonograms, with national treatment only applying to the rights enumerated in
Article 14."
45. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1706(1).
46. Id. art. 1706(3). This exception has been criticized as poorly drafted because the meanings of
"special cases" "normal exploitation:' and "legitimate interests" are not defined. See Goolsby,
supra note 12, at 21.
47. See NAFTA, supra note 5, Annex 2106.
48. See Hertz, supra note 2, at 313.
49. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1703(1) ("a Party may limit rights of performers of another
Party ... to those rights its nationals are accorded... .
50. Id.; see Goolsby, supra note 12, at 15.
51. See Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1) & 9 (musical compositions are included in
the definition of literary and artistic works).
52. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 14(1).
53. Id. art. 14(2).
54. See Hertz, supra note 2, at 313; Robert Eberschlag, Comment, Culture Clash: Canadian Peri-
odical Policies and the World Trade Organization, 26 MAN. L.J. 65, 92-93 (1998) (discussing
the failure of Canada to gain support for a general cultural exception in early Uruguay Round
negotiations).
55. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
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3. United States.
a. Statutory Law.
Sound recordings are explicitly protected as a work of authorship under the Copy-
right Act. 6 The unauthorized fixation and trafficking of sound recordings is an infringe-
ment entitling performers to the same remedies as any other form of copyright infringe-
ment." Traditionally, the United States has no general royalty or tariff system applied to
devices and recording media used to copy sound recordings, or for the public perfor-
mance of sound recordings.
This was partly changed in 1992 with the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA). s8
The AHRA created a quarterly royalty payment system payable by the first to make or
import digital audio recording devices or associated media.s9 Also, covered recording
devices must conform to the Serial Copy Management System, designed to prevent serial
copying.60 A covered device is "any machine ... distributed to individuals ... for the
primary purpose of... making a digital audio copied recording for private use."6 1 Cov-
ered media must be "primarily marketed or most commonly used ... for the purpose
of making digital audio copied recordings" by a covered device.62 Excluded are analog
recording devices or media, and digital recording devices and media for noncommercial
use by a consumer.63 Royalties are paid to a Sound Recordings Fund, administered by
representatives from the American Federation of Musicians and the American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists, 64 and to a Musical Works Fund, which distributes the
proceeds to music publishers and writers with a copyright interest. 65 No restrictions are
placed on the citizenship of artists or publishers compensated from these funds.
b. Judicial Interpretations.
In the first case of interpreting the AHRA, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction against the maker of a digital audio recording device. 66
The plaintiffs, Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), alleged that Diamond
Multimedia Systems violated the AHRA by producing a device allowing the indirect
reproduction of digital music from a transmission previously loaded onto a computer.67
56. See Copyright Act, supra note 20, § 102(a)(7). A sound recording is a work resulting "from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds,' except for sounds in audiovisual
works, such as movies. Id. § 101.
57. Id. § 1101(a).
58. Id. § 1002(a); § 1001(11) (the Act was directed toward preventing serial copying; the dupli-
cation of a copyrighted work from a previous digital copy).
59. Id. § 1003(a); § 1004(a).
60. Id. § 1002(a).
61. Id. § 1001(3).
62. Id. § 100 1(4)(A).
63. Id. § 1008.
64. Id. § 1006(b)(1).
65. Id. § 1006(b)(2).
66. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 E3d 1072,
1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
67. Id.
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RIAAs goal in enjoining Diamond was to prevent the expansion of sound recording
piracy made possible by using digital recording technology and compression algorithms
that allow the rapid downloading of digital audio computer files of music from pirate
Web sites on the Internet. 68 RIAA asserted that the device in question, the "RIO," allowed
downloading and listening on the portable hand-held machine.
The court held that the RIO was not a digital audio recording device within the
meaning of the AHRA, "because the RIO cannot make copies from transmissions, but
instead, can only make copies from a computer hard drive, it is not a digital audio
recording device."69 Personal computers are exempted from the AHRA as audio recording
devices, because their primary purpose is to run programs and record data, not copy
digital audio recordings.7" The court's holding, therefore, suggests that the AHRA covers
a narrow scope of devices and media, and is easily circumvented by using a personal
computer to transfer digital audio files.
4. Canada.
a. Statutory Law.
Similar to the United States, sound recordings are covered subject matter.71 In 1997,
Canada made two changes to increase protection for the owners of sound recordings.72
First, royalty rights were extended to performers and sound recording makers for any
public communication of their work.73 But royalties are paid only to makers who are
Canadians, permanent residents, or citizens of Rome Convention countries, or to corpo-
rations with headquarters in Canada or in a Rome Convention country.74 In addition,
royalties are paid only if the sound recording was fixed in Canada or in a Rome Con-
vention country.75 Notably, the United States is not a Rome Convention country.76 The
Minister of Industry has the discretion to limit the scope and duration of royalties to any
citizen or corporation of a Rome Convention country that, in the Minister's opinion,
does not grant rights of similar scope and duration of copyright protection as provided
in Section 19.17
68. Id. at 1074.
69. Id. at 1081.
70. Id. at 1078; see Copyright Act, supra note 20, § 1001(3) (requiring a covered device to be
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of making digital audio recordings).
71. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, § 2.2(l)(b). Sound recordings are sounds fixed
in any material form, excluding the accompanying soundtrack to a cinematographic work.
Id. §2.
72. Id. §§ 19-20.
73. Id. § 19(1).
74. Id. §20(1)(a).
75. Id. §20(l)(b).
76. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, adopted at Rome, Italy on Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter Rome Convention]. Canada joined on June 4, 1998. See Contracting Parties of
Treaties Administered by WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/eng/ratific/k-rome.htm (Rome Conven-
tion, Status on July 15, 1999).
77. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, § 20(2).
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Second, a blank tape levy was introduced.78 The levy applies to all manufacturers in
Canada, and importers into Canada, of blank audio recording media, both digital and
analog, for the purpose of trade.79 Audio recording media is defined as that "onto which
a sound recording may be reproduced and that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual
consumers for that purpose."0 The Copyright Board has the power to set the amount
and manner of collecting the tariff, and to designate the collecting body.8 '
On December 17, 1999, the Copyright Board published its decision for a tariff of
levies, 2 imposing a tariff measured per time interval of the recording media. 3 The
Board further stated that "only Canadian performers and makers are entitled to share
in the levy until the Minister issues a statement pursuant to section 85 [reciprocity
exception]....,,s4 Approximately $9 million in levies will be collected in the year 2000.5
The U.S. trade representatives have complained that Canada's blank tape levy and
public performance royalty violate TRIPS and NAFTA.86 Specifically, levy proceeds are
distributed only to Canadian or Rome Convention country performers and companies
and not to Americans. It is debatable, however, as to whether either provision violates
NAFTA. 7 First, NAFTA Article 2107 allows Canada a cultural industries exception, which
could include the protection of reproduction rights to sound recordings by Canadian
artists and producers.8 8 But the United States could bring an action under TRIPS, which
does not provide Canada with a cultural industries exception. 9 Second, article 1703(1)
of NAFTA allows reciprocal treatment rather than national treatment for sound record-
ings.90 Similarly, TRIPS does not require national treatment for the producers and per-
formers of phonograms except as enumerated in article 14."' Because the United States
does not have a comparable blank tape levy or producers right, Canada is not obligated
to provide reciprocal treatment under NAFTA or TRIPS. However, to the extent that
the AHRA provides royalties to the artists and producers of digital sound recordings,
78. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, §§ 79-88 (Private Copying).
79. Id. § 82(1).
80. Id. §79.
81. Id. §§ 83(7-8). The Canadian Private Copying Collective serves as the collecting body and
decided to delay collecting levies under the Act, which came into effect on Jan. 1, 1999. See
Newly Formed CPCC Announces Delay in Collecting Levy on Blank Audio Recording Media,
Canada News Wire, Jan. 18, 1999.
82. See Supplemental Canada Gazette Part I, Dec. 18, 1999 (visited Dec. 22, 1999), http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/tariffs/c 18121999-b.pdf.
83. See John H. Gomery, Copying for Private Use, Decision of the Board Dec. 17, 1999, at 42
(visited Dec. 22, 1999), http://www.cbcda.gc.ca/decisions/c17l21999-b.pdf.
84. Id. at 27.
85. See Greg Gazin, New Recording Levy Won't Leave the Chevy Dry: Copyright Board Decision on
Recordable Media Not as Stringent as First Expected, EDMONTON SUN, Dec. 22, 1999, at 71.
86. See Papovich, supra note 8, at 258; Hancock, supra note 13, at 529 (reviewing statements
made by U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky).
87. See Hancock, supra note 13, at 530-31.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 532.
90. Id. at 530.
91. Id.
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The blank tape levy has also raised concerns from several groups within Canada.
In Evangelical Fellowship of Canada v. Canadian Musical Reproduction Rights Agency, a
coalition petitioned for an injunction to prohibit the Copyright Board from proceeding
with implementing the levy on constitutional grounds.93 The plaintiffs comprised two
groups: religious organizations distributing religious information on tapes at no or low
cost and commercial companies selling blank tapes wholesale to professional musicians.94
The principal argument for an injunction was that the levy was a form of taxation, not
copyright legislation.9" Because the appropriate proceeding for introducing a new tax
was not complied with, the levy was unconstitutional. The Federal Court of Appeals,
however, denied the injunction.
In Canada, interlocutory injunctions based on a challenge to the constitutionality
of legislation require proof of three elements: a serious issue, irreparable harm, and bal-
ance of inconvenience. 96 While meeting the low bar of a serious issue, the court rejected
the argument that religious organizations would suffer irreparable harm by the creation
of a gray market with tapes being bought in the United States for use or resale in
Canada.97 But the court did accept the argument that there would be irreparable harm
from incurring the costs of participating in the Board's proceedings, if the levy was found
unconstitutional.9" The decision not to grant an injunction hinged on a favorable bal-
ance of public interests from the levy over inconvenience to the plaintiffs. In particular,
the levy was intended to benefit the public by promoting a "cultural industry by bolster-
ing Canadian identity and encouraging job creation."99 And exceptions for educational
institutions, libraries, archives, museums and the disabled, minimized harm.100
C. MORAL RIGHTS.
1. NA F TA.
As part of their obligations under NAFTA, each party is to give effect to the substan-
tive provisions of the Berne Convention.' But the United States is under no obligation
92. The Minister has the power to grant the right to royalties to any performers or makers who
are nationals of NAFTA countries. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, § 20(3).
93. No. A-371-99, 1999 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 9635 at *1 (F.C.A., Aug. 18, 1999).
94. Id. at *6. The Attorney General of British Columbia was also a plaintiff, objecting to the levy
as a user of blank tapes for a purpose not involving the recording of music. Id.
95. Id. at *8.
96. Id. at *7.
97. Id. at*1l.
98. Id. at *14.
99. Id. at *17.
100. Id. at "18.
101. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1701.2(b).
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to give effect to Article 6bis, giving authors a moral right to prevent modifications or
other derogatory actions against their work.' °2
2. TRIPS.
The stated objective of TRIPS is "the promotion of technological innovation and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge ... conducive to social and economic welfare ... .,,03
This endorses the American view of using copyright law to protect economic rights to
promote innovation, rather than protecting an author's moral rights to his creation.
0 4
Like NAFTA, TRIPS incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention,' 0 5 with
the exception of Article 6bis.
3. United States.
a. Statutory Law.
The United States, unlike most countries, bases copyright law on protecting the
economic rights of the author as a means to promote creativity and innovation for the
benefit of the public.0 6 Traditionally, artists transferring their copyright only have lim-
ited state statutory and common-law remedies to uphold a moral right to protect the
integrity of the work or the artist's association with the work.'0 7 Moral rights protection
under federal law was recently provided under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA).' °8 Authors may prevent the use of their name as the author in visual art in the
event the work is distorted, mutilated, or modified and would prejudice their honor or
reputation.'0 9 The author may also prevent intentional distortion, mutilation, or modi-
fication of a work prejudicing their honor or reputation or prevent the destruction of a
work of recognized stature." 0
b. Judicial Interpretations.
Although moral rights are limited only to visual works, even this narrow scope
has been controversial, as illustrated by commentary following the holding in Martin v.
102. Id., Annex 1701.3(2). Article 6bis gives authors the right to object to the distortion, muti-
lation, or modification of their work if this would prejudice their honor or reputation. See
Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6bis(l).
103. TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 7.
104. See Handa, supra note 13, at 977.
105. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 9.
106. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 26.
107. See Dana L. Burton, Comment, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights
Act, 48 SMU L.REv. 639, 650 (1998) (artists rarely receive relief solely on moral rights).
108. See Copyright Act, supra note 20, § 106A [hereinafter VARA].
109. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
110. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
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City of Indianapolis."' Martin is the only successful suit brought under VARA. 1 2 Courts
require artists to overcome several defenses that effectively restrict moral rights to a
narrower scope than provided under the Berne Convention. 1 3 For example, an artist
must show that the work is of recognized stature, was not used for advertising, was not




Canada grants authors broad moral rights to ensure the integrity of works and the
right to reasonably control their association with the work."5 Though not assignable,
moral rights may be waived-a copyright assignment does not constitute a waiver." 6
Moral rights are infringed if the author's reputation or honor is prejudiced because
the work is "distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified" or "used in association with a
product, service, cause or institution.""17 For paintings, sculptures, or engravings, prej-
udice occurs if the work is distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified."' But changing
the work's location, physical exposure or physical containment, or good faith efforts to
restore or preserve "shall not, by that act alone, constitute a distortion, mutilation or
other modification of the work."" 9
b. Judicial Interpretations.
The infringement of an author's moral rights is as common a cause of action as
copyright infringement and accepted by Canadian courts for a broad scope of sub-
ject matter. For example, in Boudreau v. Lin, the court recognized that a professor's
appropriation and publication of Boudreau's term paper under his own name was both
a copyright and moral rights infringement. 20 Damages were awarded based on "indigna-
tion at the wrong committed" rather than commercial loss."' Similarly, in Ateliers Tango
Argentin Inc. v. Festival d'Espagne et d'Amerique Latine Inc., a plaintiff photographer was
awarded damages for violation of his moral right to recognition of authorship.'22
111. 982 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997). Martin successfully sued Indianapolis for the destruction
of his sculpture in violation of his moral rights under VARA. Id.; See Sonia T. Banerji, Recent
Developments in Law and Policy under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Martin v. City of
Indianapolis and the Problem of Unwanted Art, 9 W.R.L.S.I. 99, 106-07 (1999) (reviewing
litigation arising in the United States from unwanted art).
112. See Banerji, supra note 111, at 114.
113. Id. at 122.
114. Id. at 117-26.
115. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, § 14.1(1).
116. Id. §14.1(2-3).
117. Id. §§28.2(l)(a-b).
118. Id. § 28.2(2).
119. Id. § 28.2(3).
120. [1997] 75 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 10-13 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
121. Id. at 14.
122. 119971 84 C.P.R. (3d) 56, 81 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
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D. FAIR USE DEFENSE.
1. NAFTA and TRIPS.




The scope of the fair use exceptions is broad. The Copyright Act allows "the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including ... reproduction ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment. . . " (emphasis added).12 Factors to decide if there is fair use include: the purpose
and character of the use, the nature of the work, the amount and substantiality of the
portion used compared to the work as a whole, and the impact on the work's potential
market.'24
b. Judicial Interpretations.
Parody is a special example of criticism recognized as fair use by U.S. courts. In the
leading case defining the scope of the parody defense, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed
2 Live Crew's rap music version of Roy Orbison's song "Pretty Woman" as an exception
to infringement under the fair use parody defense despite otherwise unfavorable fac-
tors. 2 ' The Court acknowledged that the parody had a commercial purpose and took a
substantial portion of Orbison's work.'26 But a commercial purpose does not presump-




The Canadian Copyright Act provides an exception for any fair dealing with any
work if the source and author's name is mentioned. 12 The fair dealing exception applies
to "research or private study" or "criticism or review" or "news reporting.' 129
b. Judicial Interpretations.
Fair dealing in Canada is not the same as fair use in the United States. Courts
have construed the fair dealing exceptions to infringement as only those listed in the
123. Copyright Act, supra note 20, § 107.
124. Id.
125. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994).
126. Id. at 587-88.
127. Id. at 591.
128. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note 32, § 29.1(a-b).
129. Id. §29(1-2).
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Canadian Copyright Act.'3 0 For example, in Michelin, the defendants depicted the plain-
tiff's copyrighted "Bibendum" figure stomping on the heads of union workers.'31 The
court rejected the defendant's argument that their use of the Bibendum was fair dealing
in the form of parody."' The court noted that, unlike the United States' open-ended list
of exceptions, the exceptions to infringement are listed exhaustively as a closed set.'33
Since parody was not explicitly mentioned in the Act "parody does not exist as [criti-
cism], an exception to copyright infringement."'*3 4
Fair dealing also differs from fair use in that the former requires the source to be
mentioned and to receive fair treatment by the critic. The Michelin court noted that the
defendants failed to mention Michelin as the source of the Bibendum, a requirement
added to the Canadian Copyright Act pursuant to implementing NAFTA.' 35 Parody does
not absolve the critic from treating the source fairly, otherwise making "the parody label
the last refuge of the scoundrel."' 36
III. Patent Law.
A. LIFE FORMS AS VALID SUBJECT MATTER.
1. NAFTA.
Each party must "make patents available for any invention, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology....,137 Patentability is conditioned on showing that
the invention is new, results from an innovative step (synonymous with nonobvious),
and capable of industrial application (synonymous with usefulness). 3 A nondiscrimina-
tion provision states that "patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the field of technology, the territory of the Party where the invention
was made and whether products are imported or locally produced.' 39
Broad exclusions are allowed, however, if "necessary to protect the ordre public or
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to nature or the environment ... *"140 But exclusions may not be applied solely
because "the Party prohibits the commercial exploitation ... of the subject matter of the
130. See Compagnie G~n~rale des tstablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada [ 19961
71 C.P.R. (3d) 348, 381 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.); Bishop, supra note 36, at 407-408 (exceptions
to infringement should be narrowly interpreted).
131. See Michelin, supra note 130, at 354.
132. Id. at 379 (comparing the present holding to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Campbell).
133. Id. at 381.
134. Id. at 382.
135. Id. at 383. The Court rejected as a circular, the argument that parody does not require
mention of the source because the source is implicitly mentioned. Id. at 382.
136. Id. at 384. The court, defining fair as "free from discrimination, dishonesty, etc. just; impar-
tial' ruled that portraying the "Bibendum" as the "boss's henchman" was not fair. Id.
137. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1709(1).
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 1709(7).
140. Id. art. 1709(2).
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patent""' Several discretionary specific exclusions are enumerated, including therapeutic
methods, higher life forms, and biological processes for producing plants and animals.'42
These exclusions are contrary to the United States' desire to broaden the scope of
patentability to protect its biotechnology industry.'43 Because "ordre public" and "moral-
ity" are left undefined, they are open to a broad interpretation by each party. 144 For
example, Canada and Mexico have the discretion to interpret their patent laws to exclude




TRIPS extends the same broad scope of patentability as NAFTA with nearly identical
language. 46 Similar to NAFTA, a nondiscrimination provision is included. 147 But the
same discretionary subject matter exclusions as in NAFTA are also offered to Members
to protect "ordre public or morality," so long as the Member's "exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law."14 Diagnostic, therapeutic,
and surgical methods for treating humans and animals, higher life forms themselves,
and biological processes for producing higher life forms are specifically mentioned as




No changes were made in the definition of patentable subject matter following the
NAFTA or TRIPS agreements. A patentable invention is "any ... process, machine,
manufacture, . . . composition of matter, or ... improvement thereof....50
b. Judicial Interpretations.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, by a five to four margin, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed the patentability of a transgenic bacterium containing genes inserted from other
species of bacteria.' The genes result in the expression of enzymes that degrade com-
ponents of crude oil. The Court interpreted the language of Section 101 to mean that
141. Id. art. 1709(2).
142. Id. art. 1709(3).
143. See Kevin W. McCabe, Comment, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability of
Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 43 (1998).
144. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 37.
145. See McMahon, supra note 7, at 34-35.
146. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 27(1). There is explicit agreement that "innovative step" and
"capable of industrial application" are synonymous with nonobvious and usefulness, respec-
tively, as used in the United States. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. art. 27(2).
149. Id. art. 27(3).
150. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) [hereinafter Patent Act].
151. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
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Congress intended a broad scope of patentable subject matter-including unanticipated
subject matter like living organisms.' 52 In contrast, the dissent believed that Congress's
passage of the Plant Patenting Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act showed no broad
mandate allowing the patenting of life forms.1
3
For the majority, the key to patentability was human intervention to produce a
new microorganism "with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature
and ... the potential for significant utility."'54 The majority rejected arguments that
potential hazards should be considered as part of the decision as to whether an invention
should be patented.'55 Rather, the Court's task was merely to determine what Congress
meant by the words it used in section 101.156
Consistent with the holding in Chakrabarty, in Ex parte Allen, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences held that multicellular organisms such as oysters could be
patented as new manufactures or compositions under Section 101, so long as they were
not naturally occurring.' 57 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) broadened
its view on the scope of patentable subject matter to include nonhuman, multicellular
organisms, including animals and human tissues modified by man. 158 Chakrabarty and
Allen set the stage for allowing the patenting of genetically engineered mammals in the
United States. The onco-mouse and all its progeny were granted patent protection in
1988 by the PTO.'159
4. Canada.
a. Statutory Law.
Canada also made no changes in the definition of patentable subject matter fol-
lowing NAFTA or TRIPS. An invention is "any new and useful art, process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."'6 °
152. Id. at 308-10.
153. Id. at 320. The Majority rejected this, arguing that both the 1930 and 1970 Acts were simply
intended to circumvent written description statutory bars to the patenting of artificially bred
plants. Id. at 312-13.
154. Id. at 310.
155. Id. at 316-17.
156. Id. at 307.
157. See Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1427 (1987).
158. See Eileen Morin, Comment, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH
L.J. 147, 157 & 157 n.62 (1997) (citing the Interpretive Statement of the U.S. Commissioner
of Patents, 1077 Official Gazette Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987)).
159. Filed June 1984-date of patent Apr. 12, 1988. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866. The Harvard
onco-mouse is a useful animal model for cancer research because the mouse and its progeny
carry inserted recombinant onco-genes that result in an increased susceptibility to cancer.
Id. The uncontested patenting of the onco-mouse in the United States contrasts with a long
course of deliberations for the same application at the European Patent Office. See generally
Darrell G. Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19
Hous. J. INT'L L. 919, 927-33 (1997) (reviewing the first seven years of European Patent
Office rulings concerning the onco-mouse patent application).
160. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Patent Act] (visited Jan.
11, 2000), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/P/P-4.html.
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b. Judicial Interpretations.
Similar to the United States, decisions from the 1980s suggested that life forms were
not barred from patentability per se. In Re Application of Abitibi Co., the Patent Appeal
Board held that a yeast culture was patentable because it possessed uniform properties
that were readily reproducible. 6 ' In dicta, the Board stated that there was no statu-
tory bar to patenting complex life forms if they comprised an invention that was new,
nonobvious, useful, and reproducible.'62 But, in Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Canada, the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that a new soybean variety produced from artificial crossbreeding
was not patentable on the grounds of inadequate disclosure.163 Although the inven-
tor had described several crossbreeding procedures to improve the yield of the target
variety, "someone skilled in the science of the invention could not arrive at the same
result . . . without further explanation."'" The court accepted without comment the
appellate court's opinion that the Canadian Patent Act does not exclude the patentability
of living organisms.
61
Nevertheless, the onco-mouse patent application was denied by the Commissioner
of Patents in 1995, on the grounds that the onco-mouse was primarily a product of
nature. 66 The trial court affirmed the Commissioner's holding that nonhuman mammals
did not constitute an invention for the purposes of the Canadian Patent Act. 67 Key to
the holding was the court's interpretation of what constitutes an invention. 6
The court set forth four elements to guide decisions concerning a patentable inven-
tion. First, it is not necessary for the inventor to have control over all characteristics
of the invention, although some element of control is necessary. 69 Second, the court
would distinguish between human intervention and laws of nature when determining
the scope of patentable subject matter.' Third, the invention must be reproducible.' 7'
Finally, in the absence of direction from the legislature, the court would not distinguish
between higher and lower life forms with respect to patentability. 72 The onco-mouse
patent failed in the second and third elements.
The court distinguished between the process of creating the plasmid containing
onco-genes and introducing it into an oocyte, versus the subsequent effects of this
process-breeding a mouse implanted with eggs containing the onco-gene with a nor-
mal mouse.7 3 The court found the latter was analogos to the crossbreeding process in
161. See Re Application of Abitibi Co. 11982] 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81, 91 (P.A.B.).
162. Id. at 90.
163. [1989] 25 C.P.R. (3d) 257, 272 (S.C.C.).
164. Id. at 270.
165. I. at 260.
166. See Morin, sitpra note 158, at 147 n.3 (citing the unpublished decision discussed in J. Rudolph,
C. Collard & C. Ledgley, Reporting of the Biotechnology Legislation Committee, 13 CAN. INTELL.
Pkop. RE.v. 55, 60 (1996)).
167. See Harvard College v. Canada [1998] 79 C.P.R. (3d) 98, 115 (F.C.T.D.).
168. Id. at 106. The court accepted that the invention was new, useful, and nonobvious. Id.
169. Id. at 110.
170. Id. at 111.
171. Id. at 113.
172. Id. at 114.
173. Id. at 112.
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Pioneer Hi-Bred, which was non-patentable.' 74 In particular, all the characteristics of the
resulting mouse were uncontrolled except for the onco-gene. Further, the presence, loca-
tion, and quality of the onco-gene's expression in any one mouse was left to chance.
75
For these reasons, the court held that patentability should be limited to the creation of
the plasmid and the process of introducing it into the mouse oocyte-not the mouse
and its progeny. 76 Harvard has appealed the trial court's decision.'77
B. COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTED DRUGS.
1. NAFTA.
Parties "may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent:'
so long as two conditions are met. 178 First, the exceptions "do not unreasonably con-
flict with a normal exploitation of the patent."'7 9 Second, the patent holder's legitimate
interests are not unreasonably prejudiced, "taking into account the legitimate interest
of other persons."'8 ° Terms like "normal exploitation," "not unreasonably prejudiced,"
and "legitimate interests" are not defined. 8' Consequently, parties have almost unlim-
ited discretion to interpret the scope of allowable exceptions as they see fit. For example,
it has been speculated that provincial governments in Canada, seeking to reduce their
health care costs, would seek a compulsory license for certain patented medicines and
then import those medicines.'
82
Preventing this kind of behavior are twelve provisions that a proposed user (includ-
ing the government) must respect before a party can allow licensed use without autho-
rization by the patent holder.'83 Among the provisions is the requirement that the
"proposed user [makes an] effort to obtain authorization from the right holder on rea-
sonably commercial terms ... within a reasonable period of time."' l" Waiver is allowed
in cases of national emergency or public non-commercial use.' In addition, the right
174. Id. at 114.
175. Id. at 113.
176. Id. at 115. Although not used as a basis for rejecting the patent applicable, J. Nadon agreed
with the minority in Charkrabarty that like the U.S. Patent Act, the Canadian Patent Act
excluded complex life forms. Id. at 114. But see Franco E. Rossetto, Patentability of Higher Life
Forms Debate Far From Over, 18 LAWYERS WKLY. (Sept. 25, 1998) (technological advances
in genetic engineering since the onco-mouse patent application was submitted in 1984 have
rendered the Court's basis for rejecting the patent as moot).
177. See Harvard College, 79 C.P.R. at 115; Jean Christie, Should Canada Allow Patents on New
Plants and Animals? LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 3, 2000, at All, available at 2000 WL 2114891.
178. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1709(6).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 36.
182. See McMahon, supra note 7, at 36.
183. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1709(10)(a).
184. Id. art. 1709(10)(b).
185. Id.
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holder must be paid adequate remuneration, 8 6 the use must be nonexclusive," 7 non-
assignable,' and subject to judicial or other independent review.' 89
2. TRIPS.
TRIPS permits Members to exempt exclusive rights to patents, subject to the same
two conditions as in NAFTA.' 90 Similar to NAFTA, compulsory licensing is granted
only after the user attempts to obtain a voluntary license with reasonable terms and
conditions, the patentee is paid adequate remuneration, and the reasonable value of the
invention has been taken into account.' 9 In addition, the patentee has the right to make




Superficially, compulsory licensing is inconsistent with the U.S. Patent Act, which
imposes no duty on a patent holder "to license or use any rights to the patent... -,'9'
But long before the NAFTA or TRIPS agreements, Congress enacted Section 271(e) and
Section 156 as part of the Drug Price Competition Act and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 (Waxman-Hatch Act). 194 The Waxman-Hatch Act strikes a compromise between
the interests of innovative drug makers, the desire of generic drug makers to avoid
unnecessary testing, and the public's need for safe and inexpensive drugs.'95 This com-
promise was addressed by fixing two perceived problems associated with the patenting
of pharmaceuticals.
186. Id. art. 1709(10)(h).
187. Id. art. 1709(10)(d).
188. Id. art. 1709(10)(e).
189. Id. art. 1709(10)(i-j).
190. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 30.
191. Id. art. 31. McCabe has interpreted these provisions as allowing compulsory licensing but
with severe conditions. See McCabe, supra note 143, at 59. But see Goolsby, supra note 12,
at 40 (interpreting nearly identical language in NAFTA and concluding that "[t]he impact of
the mandatory provisions on actual compulsory licensing systems remains to be seen").
192. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 3 1(i). NAFTA has substantially the same provisions. See NAFTA,
supra note 5, art. 1709(10)(k).
193. Patent Act, supra note 150, § 271(d)(4) (1994). U.S. courts have rarely imposed this obliga-
tion, limiting this as a remedy where a patent was wrongfully obtained or used in association
with monopolistic behavior. See James B. Kobak, Antitrust Treatment of Refusal to License
Intellectual Property, 566 PLI/P, at 517, 531-35 (1999) (reviewing exceptions to the general
rule that an intellectual property owner has no duty to license).
194. See David J. Bloch, IfIt's Regulated Like a Duck ... Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent
Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 54 FooD DRUG L.J.
111, 112 (1999).
195. See Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc. v. Food and Drug Admin., 836 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818 (1988) (reviewing the formation and goals of the DPCA and noting
that the Act only applies to drugs for human use-generic drug makers for animals are still
required to generate and provide test data).
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First, Section 156 allowed a five-year patent extension to compensate for "front-
end distortion" resulting in shortened patent protection due to the long delay between
patenting and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for marketing. 19 6 Second,
Section 271(e) compensates for "back-end distortion," resulting in lengthened patent
protection because generic drug makers were considered to infringe if they conducted
tests on a patented drug for the purposes of gathering information for FDA approval. 97
Section 271(e) allows an exception to patent infringement "for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products."9 ' While increasing
the period of market protection and decreasing the entry time of generic drugs, the
merits of continuing the Waxman-Hatch Act have been questioned. 9
b. Judicial Interpretations.
The degree of exception allowed under Section 271(e) has varied widely.2"' The
debate centers on the meaning of the phrase "solely for uses reasonably related."2' A
minority of courts interpret Section 271(e)(1) to allow a narrow exception for performing
tests on a patented drug necessary to get FDA approval for a generic version of the
drug after the patent expired. 2 2 The majority of courts, however, have concluded that
196. See Patent Act, supra note 150, § 156 (1994).
197. Id. §271(e)(1) (1994).
198. Id.
199. Data showing an increased period of market protection (2.4 years) and shorter entry peri-
ods for generic drugs (decreasing from three to four years, to one to three months) led the
Congressional Budget Office to conclude that the FDCA successfully increased the market
share for less expensive generic drugs while not detracting from the incentive for inno-
vative drug companies. See Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition from
Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, July 1998,
Chapter Four, Table 7 (visited Oct. 24, 1999), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655&
sequence=0&from=l#anchor; but see Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Phar-
maceutics: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 392 (1999) (the FDCA pro-
motes abusive use of the Act by both generic and innovative drug makers, imparts no benefit
to the public, and causes the migration of drug manufacturing out of the United States);
Joseph P. Reid, Note, A Generic Drug Price Scandal: Too Bitter a Pill for the Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act to Swallow?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 309, 338-39
(1999) (the FDCA failed to contain drug costs and imposes hardships on innovative drug
makers).
200. See generally Bloch, supra note 194, at 120-26; Courtenay C. Brinkerhoff, Comment, Can the
Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1) Shelter the Pioneer Drug Manufacturer?, 53 FooD DRUG
L.J. 643, 648-54 (1998).
201. See Patent Act, supra note 150, §271(e)(1).
202. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1396 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (Genentech's entering into a contract to develop a method for commercial manufac-
turing or to obtain bioequivalence data required by the FDA, and filing a European Patent
application, were uses that served additional functions besides obtaining FDA approval, and
therefore were infringing on Scripp's patent); Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391,
396 (D. Mass 1996) (larger scale production and market production are not exceptions under
§ 271(e)(1)); Brinkerhoff, supra note 200, at 651-52 (legislative history suggests that Congress
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activities having additional uses beyond getting FDA approval are within the scope of
exceptions to infringement allowed under Section 271(e)(1). 20 3
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section
271(e)(1) also applies to medical devices, because the phrase "a Federal law,' historically
refers to the entire subject matter of the statute, not just drugs or veterinary products. 20 4
The Court found support for this view from the language of the Waxman-Hatch Act,
indicating that the scopes of Section 156 and Section 271(e)(1) were complementary.205
Therefore, all products (i.e., drugs and medical devices) subject to a patent extension
under Section 156 should be subject to Section 271(e)(l) infringement exceptions.2 0 6 The
Court concluded that this broad construction better served Congress's goals of correcting
patent term distortion and making generic versions available as soon as possible after




Before 1987, all prescription pharmaceuticals were subject to compulsory licens-
ing.208 Canadian generic drug manufacturing companies paid a minimal royalty payment
for the right to market generic copies of patented pharmaceuticals. 209 Generic drug mak-
ers flourished because they could sell drugs at a lower cost than innovative drug makers,
having minimal research and development expenses to recover. Compulsory licensing
also directly reduced government spending, because the federal and provincial govern-
ments are major drug purchasers in Canada's government-administered health care sys-
tem.2 " Although keeping the price of prescription drugs low, this system provided little
intended the § 271(e) infringement exception to narrowly apply to experimentation with a
patented drug in preparation for commercial activity after expiration of the patent).
203. See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (it
is not infringing to demonstrate a product at a conference or show data to investors for
business purposes); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991) aff'd 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (nonprecedential) (the key question is whether the
activities result in information that reasonably could contribute to FDA approval); Abtox, Inc.
v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (informing customers that a product
will be commercially available or planning to introduce a rival product before the patent
expires is not infringing); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104,
110 (D. Mass. 1998) (it is not an infringement to make and export a patented compound for
use as a standard reference to evaluate alternative manufacturing process or for safety tests
meeting European regulatory standards).
204. See 496 U.S. 661, 666 (1990).
205. Id. at 673.
206. Id. at 671-72.
207. Id. at 669-70.
208. See Michael B. Moore, Comment, "Open Wide" (Your Pocket Book That Is!)-A Call for the
Establishment in the United States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1 S.W. J.L.
& TRADE AM. 149, 162 (1994) (reviewing Canada's Patented Medicine Prices Review Board).
209. See Novopharm Ltd. v. Janssen Pharm. N.V. [1992] 41 C.P.R.(3d) 384, 389 (court refusing to
require more than a four percent royalty to be paid to the patent holder).
210. See Moore, supra note 208, at 162.
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incentive for innovative drug companies to invest in research and development programs
inside Canada.
In 1987, the Canadian Patent Act was amended to give innovative drug makers an
exclusivity period for seven years against production and for ten years against importa-
tion.21 ' The price of drugs, however, was still regulated during this exclusivity period by
the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. 2 12 At the end of the exclusivity period, com-
pulsory licensing was allowed. 213 The Board set guidelines for the price that innovative
drug makers could sell to wholesalers, and the Board could revoke the manufacturer's
patent for noncompliance.
21 4
In 1997, several changes were made in compliance with TRIPS and NAFTA. 21s Patent
protection was extended to twenty years for all technologies, including pharmaceuticals,
and compulsory licensing was eliminated." 6 The Board's power to revoke patents was
removed." 7 But the Board's capacity to impose fines and imprisonment for noncompli-
ance with their price guidelines was expanded." Existing compulsory licenses granted
before December 20, 1991 remained in force.2 19 Similar to 35 U.S.C §271(e), it is not
an infringement "to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under
any law of Canada...220
The Board's monitoring and enforcement activities may explain why drug prices are
nearly half as expensive for consumers in Canada compared to America.22' Alternatively,
the impact of Canada's changes in its patent laws only now may be felt as new drugs
are developed and marketed without a generic equivalent. 222 So far, the U.S. Congress
211. Id.; see Patricia Carter, Federal Regulation in the United States and Canada, 21 Loy. L.A.
INT'L CoMP. L.J. 215, 242 n.221 (citing Joel Lexchin's suggestion that the elimination of
Canada's compulsory licensing was a condition for U.S. approval of the FTA. See Joel Lexchin,
Pharmaceuticals, Patents & Politics: Canada & Bill C-22 (Feb. 1992) (paper prepared for The
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives)).
212. See Moore, supra note 208, at 163.
213. See Carter, supra note 211, at 242-43.
214. See Moore, supra note 208, at 164.
215. See Carter, supra note 211, at 244-45; NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1709(12).
216. See Carter, supra note 211, at 243. The United States also increased the term of patent
protection from seventeen to twenty years, as required by TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 9,
art. 33.
217. See Moore, supra note 208, at 164.
218. Id. at 164 n.85.
219. See G. Alexander Macklin & Emma A. Grell, Canada Doctors Its Pharmaceutical Patents,
IP World Wide (January/February 1996) (visited Aug. 31, 1999), http://www.ipww.com/
january96/p 13Canada.html.
220. Canadian Patent Act, supra note 160, § 55.2 (1).
221. See Bernie Sanders, We Pay Too Much for Prescribed Drugs, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 1999, at
13A (citing a 1998 study by the House Democrats and an international study by the PRIME
Institute); Moore, supra note 208, at 165.
222. Drug costs to patients increased by 12.7 percent in 1998, and for the first time in ten years,
the growth in brand name drugs sales outpaced generic drugs. See Impact of Bill C-91 and
Additional Patent Protection Only Now Being Felt, Says Canadian Drug Manufacturers Associ-
ation, Canada News Wire Ltd., Apr. 12, 1999, available in LEXIS, Canadian Publications File
(citing a survey by IMS Health (Canada)).
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has declined to adopt a price review board, fearing that price guidelines might decrease
expenditures on research and development by the pharmaceutical industry in the United
States.223
b. Judicial Interpretations.
Canada's long history of allowing compulsory licensing has created a powerful
generic drug industry. Generic drug makers have mounted a vigorous legal campaign to
resist the most recent changes to Canada's patent laws.224 In turn, innovative drug makers
have challenged the jurisdiction of the Patented Medicines Price Review Board.225 The
Supreme Court's willingness to consider three cases involving litigation between generic
and innovative drug companies illustrates the importance of drug pricing and patent
regulation. 2
6
All three cases involved Canada's two largest generic drug companies, Apotex and
Novopharm. In 1993, anticipating that compulsory licensing laws were about to be
repealed, the two companies entered into a mutual "supply agreement;' where the
companies would share their existing licenses for each other's benefit. 227 When Apotex
attempted to obtain a notice of compliance for patented drugs for which Novopharm
had obtained a license, the innovative drug companies Eli Lilly and Merck applied for a
court order to halt Ministerial approval. 22' Eli Lilly and Merck argued that Novapharm's
agreement with Apotex amounted to a sublicense, in violation of its compulsory license
agreement with Lilly and Merck. 229 Three trial division courts found that there was no
sublicense-three appellate courts reversed, finding that there was a sublicense.230 The
appellate court ruling spelled serious economic hardship for the generic drug companies
because violating a compulsory licensing agreement meant revocation of the license.
231
223. See Carter, supra note 211, at 248-49.
224. Nearly 150 patent infringement cases between generic and innovative drug makers are pend-
ing. See John Greenwood, Generic Drug Makers Get Shot in Arm from Supreme Court, FINAN-
CIAL POST, July 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, Canadian Publications file.
225. For example, in ICN Pharmaceuticals, the court held that the Board had broad jurisdiction
to review prices and take remedial action for excessive prices so long as there was "the merest
slender thread" of rational connection between the inventor's patent and the medicine being
sold. This follows from the fact that the Board was created to replace the price controls that
previously provided by compulsory licensing. See ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Patented Med.
Prices Review Bd. (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 71, 89-91.
226. See generally Sheldon Burshtein, Sublicense or Supply Agreement? Supreme Court of Canada
Interpretation Benefits Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, 54 FoOD DRUG L.J. 73 (reviewing the
holding in all three cases at the trial, appellate and supreme court level: Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Novopharm, Ltd., and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex, Inc. (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 321; Merck Frosst
Canada Inc. v. Canada (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 368).
227. See Burshtein, supra note 226, at 77.
228. Id. at 79.
229. Id. at 79-83.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 73. This would also mean serious cost over runs for provincial government health plans
dependent on the purchase of lower costing generic drugs. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Canada reversed all three appellate court holdings, ruling
that there was no sublicense agreement between Novapharm and Apotex.2 32 The court
reasoned that there was no sublicense because Apotex was unable to obtain the patented
medicines independent of Novopharm. 233 Therefore, Novopharm had not violated the
terms of its compulsory license with Eli Lilly and Merck, and Apotex had not infringed
the patents.2 34 The court also ruled that it is not an infringement for a licensee to refor-
mulate a drug's final dosage into a commercial usable form. 235 The later rulings in part
may have been motivated by the desire to curtail litigation involving the "evergreening"
of drugs, a tactic where innovative drug makers try to patent each new formulation of a
drug, and thereby narrow the scope of what generic drug makers can produce without
infringing existing licenses.236
IV. Trade Secret Law.
A. PHARMACEUTICAL TESTING DATA SUBMITTED TO
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
1. NAFTA.
NAFTA requires legal means to prevent trade secrets from being disclosed, acquired,
or used by others "in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices."2 37 A non-
inclusive list of examples shows what minimally is contrary to honest commercial prac-
tice.23 Three elements are required to establish trade secret protection.239 First, the infor-
mation, "as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components," is
not "generally known among or readily accessible to" persons that normally deal with
this kind of information. 240 Second, the information "has actual or potential commercial
value because it is secret."241 Third, the person in lawful control of the information "has
taken reasonable steps ... to keep it secret.-
242
NAFTA also requires that trade secrets be protected against unfair commercial use
when undisclosed tests or other data are submitted to government agencies as a condition
for approval to market drugs or agricultural chemical products.243 If an applicant relies




236. See Novopharm Vindicated in Seven Year Patent Dispute with Glaxo, CANADA NEWS WIRE
LTD., Aug. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, Canadian Publications File.
237. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1711(1).
238. "Breach of contract, breach of confidence[,j ... inducement to breach, and ... the acqui-
sition of undisclosed information by other persons who knew, or were grossly negligent in
failing to know, that such practices were involved in the acquisition.' Id. art. 1721(2).
239. Id. art. 1711(1)(a-c).
240. Id. art. 1711(1)(a).
241. Id. art. 1711(1)(b).
242. Id. art. 1711(l)(c).
243. Id. art. 1711(5). The only exception is where "disclosure is necessary to protect the public"
or "steps are taken to ensure ... unfair commercial use." Id. These exceptions are vague
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on test data from a competitor's prior application, then the party must hold approval,
"normally ... not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval
to the person that produced the data .. ."" This provision was designed to prevent
generic drug makers from using the test data of innovative drug makers to support their
own product's approval. 4
2. TRIPS.
TRIPS requires Members to ensure a legal means to prevent the use, acquisition,
or disclosure by others, contrary to honest commercial practice. Similar to NAFTA, to
qualify for protection the owner must prove they have commercially valuable informa-
tion, which is not publicly known, and that they have taken reasonable steps to maintain
the information as secret.24 6 Whereas NAFTA allows a showing of actual or potential
commercial value, TRIPS is slightly more stringent in requiring that the information
"has commercial value because it is a secret.' 247 TRIPS also requires protecting data sub-
mitted to Members as a condition for approval to market pharmaceutical or agricultural
products, although no minimum holding period is specified. 248
3. United States.
a. Statutory Law.
Trade secret protection derives from the statutory and common law of individual
states.2 49 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), used as a model statute by the majority
of states, defines a trade secret as information with "independent economic value, actual
or potential ... "' that is not "generally known to, and not ... readily ascertainable by
proper means . . . " and subject to reasonable efforts to maintain it secret. 5 To establish
a cause of action, the plaintiff must prove they have qualified subject matter, the defen-
dant misappropriated their trade secret, and the plaintiff took reasonable precautions
to prevent disclosure. 25' Misappropriation occurs when one acquires the trade secret by
improper means or breaches a confidential relationship. 2 2 The wording of NAFTA and
and subject to Party discretion, and therefore may render article 1711(5) meaningless. See
Goolsby, supra note 12, at 47.
244. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1711(6). Subject to this provision, abbreviated approval procedures
based on bioequivalence and bioavailability are allowed. Id.
245. See Lars Noah, NAFTA's Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 Hous. L. REV. 1293,
1298-1300 (1997).
246. See TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 39(2)(a-c).
247. Id. art. 39(2).
248. Id. art. 39(3). Similar to NAFTA, an exception is allowed "where necessary to protect the
public" or "steps as taken to ensure ... against unfair commercial use." Id.
249. See generally Merges, supra note 30, at 29-32 (history of trade secret protection in the U.S.).
250. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § t (4)(i-ii) (1985) [hereinafter UTSA]. Forty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have enacted the UTSA. See Merges, supra note 30, at 32.
251. See Merges, supra note 30, at 33-34.
252. See UTSA, supra note 250, §§ 1(2)(i-ii).
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TRIPS closely follows the UTSA and, consequently, no specific changes were made as a
result of these agreements. 253
The FDA has the duty to ensure that all new drugs are safe and effective in use. 254 In
the United States, the public interest in having rapid approval of lower costing generic
drugs is balanced against the innovative drug maker's interest to not lose its patent
protection or trade secrets disclosed as part of the approval process. The FDA imposes
several restrictions on the approval of drugs when the applicants did not do the testing
themselves. Typically, a generic drug maker files an accelerated new drug application
(ANDA) by showing bioequivalence to an already approved drug, instead of submitting
new animal and human studies showing safety and effectiveness. 25 The applicant must
certify that a patented drug "will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the
new drug for which the application is submitted .. ..""' Alternatively, the applicant may
certify that the patent is invalid or has expired and, therefore, will not be infringed.25 7 If
either of the latter two certifications is made, then the generic drug maker must notify
the patentee.258 The patentee has forty-five days from notification to sue the applicant
for patent infringement under 21 U.S.C. §271(e)(2). 25 9 If the patentee sues, then the
commercial manufacture or sale of the drug by the applicant is put on hold for five
years, or until the patent is determined by a court to be invalid or not infringed.2 60
Several additional statutory restrictions ensure that trade secrets disclosed as part
of gaining agency approval or complying with agency regulations are kept confidential.
Any employee or officer of the United States who discloses information gained in the
course of their employment or official duties is subject to removal from office and
fines or imprisonment, or both, under the Trade Secrets Act. 26' Trade secrets required
to be submitted to a public agency are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 262 Trade secrets revealed to the FDA are entitled to protection by the agencies,
officers, and employees. 263
253. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 57.
254. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(b)(1) (1999) [hereinafter FDCA].
255. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). For bioequivalence, the rate and extent of absorption must not be
significantly different from the approved drug. See id. §355(j)(8)(B)(i); Schering Corp. v
FDA, 51 E3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 274 (1995) (holding that the
statute's definition of absorption was ambiguous, but the FDA's interpretation of "available
at the site of drug action" was a permissible construction). A drug maker may also file a new
drug application by using published studies done by others to show safety and effectiveness.
See FDCA, supra note 254, § 355(b)(2).
256. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
257. Id.
258. Id. §355(j)(2)(B)(i).
259. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
260. Id. A similar process exists for a new drug application. Id. § 355(c).
261. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 1905 (1999).
262. See 5 U.S.C.S. §552(b)(4) (1999).
263. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 331(j) (1999).
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b. Judicial Interpretations.
The scope of exception for trade secrets under the FOIA has added importance in
light of increased litigation between generic and innovative drug makers and mutual
recognition agreement between the United States and the European Union to share con-
fidential information submitted to the FDA or its foreign equivalent.264 The extent to
which the public should have access to safety and effectiveness data for new drugs sub-
mitted for approval to the FDA has long been debated.265 Disclosure may increase an
agency's effectiveness by allowing outside open scientific comment and inquiry about the
adequacy of the safety and effectiveness data.2" The public would have more informa-
tion to evaluate the risks and rewards of a particular drug.267 The need for duplicative
testing by a second company would be reduced.2 61 Innovations in drug discovery could
be aided.269 The argument against disclosure is that it erodes the benefit a company
gains from performing health and safety testing and therefore decreases the motive for
innovation and discovery.27° This would be especially harmful for drugs not protected
under a patent.27'
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court shall "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action ... not in accordance with law:' and that "any dis-
closure that violates § 1905 [Trade Secrets Act] is 'not in accordance with law' within the
meaning of § 706(2)(A) [Administrative Procedures Act]" 27 2 Information submitted to a
government agency is confidential if disclosure "(1) impair[s] the Government's ability
to obtain necessary information in the future" or "(2) cause[s] substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained."273 Never-
theless, the FDA has been accused of adopting a pro-disclosure approach. 274 In response,
innovative drug makers may sue the FDA under Chrysler, claiming that disclosure of
their trade secrets would be arbitrary and capricious.
2 7 5
Conversely, public citizen groups have sued the FDA for failing to disclose test data
under the FOIA. For example, Public Citizen Health Research Group (Public Citizen)
264. See James T. O'Reilly, Implications of International Drug Approval Systems on Confidentiality
of Business Secrets in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 Food DRUG L.J. 123, 124 (1998)
(discussing the FDA's willingness to disclose privately generated research data).
265. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Polices, 93 HARV. L. REv. 837 (1980).
266. Id. at 842.
267. Id. at 844.
268. Id. at 845.
269. Id. at 848.
270. Id. at 849.
271. Id. at 850-51.
272. 441 U.S. 281, 318 (1979). See also McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 265, at 858-59 (reviewing
the Chrysler holding).
273. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (inter-
preting the scope of protects offered by 5 U.S.C. § 552).
274. See O'Reilly, supra note 264, at 129 & 129 nn.34-39 (reviewing policy statements and argu-
ments presented by the FDA in court cases favoring disclosure).
275. Id. at 129 & 129 n.45; see Schering, 51 F.3d at 396 (innovative drug makers have standing
to challenge the FDA concerning the implementation of its regulations on the approval of a
generic drug through the ANDA process).
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sued the FDA when it refused to disclose the protocol of a FDA-required, post-market
survey conducted by Bristol-Myers Squibb concerning the efficacy and side effects of
an antihyperglycemic drug.276 The court rejected as speculative, innovator-defendant
Squibb's argument that disclosure would allow competitors to raise safety concerns about
the drug.277 The court ruled that to qualify for protection against disclosure there must
be proof of competitive injury resulting from disclosure of the protocol.27 Public Citizen
also challenged the FDAs refusal to release safety and effectiveness data submitted as an
investigational new drug application (INDA) to the FDA by Schering Corporation.27 1 The
district court granted Public Citizen's motion for summary judgment and ordered the
release of the information on the grounds that 21 U.S.C. § 355(l) mandates disclosure,
absent extraordinary circumstances. The appellate court reversed, however, holding the
FOIA was not applicable to INDAs and does not support the disclosure of information
to prevent other drug companies from repeating past mistakes from human testing.280
Courts have also upheld the FDA's right to withhold confidential information requested




Like the United States, trade secret protection in Canada derives from local and
common-law principles.28 2 The Supreme Court of Canada applies a three-element test
to determine a breach of confidence: (1) the information is confidential; (2) the infor-
mation is conveyed under conditions creating an obligation of confidence; and (3) the
information is misused, to the detriment of the owner of the information.2 3 An excep-
tion to the disclosure of information submitted to government institutions is allowed if
the information contains trade secrets treated as confidential, and which could change
the financial position, prejudice the competitive position, or interfere with contractual
276. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 964 F. Supp. 413, 414 (1997).
277. Id. at 415. The court suggested that even a legitimate concern about "alarmism" would not
qualify for an exemption from the FOIA under § 552(b)(4). Id. at 415 n.2.
278. Id. at 416.
279. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Before
submitting a new drug application, the FDA requires the submission of an INDA, describing
the drug, laboratory, and preclinical testing, and proposed clinical testing. Id.
280. Id. at 903-04. Rather, the FOIA is intended to allow the public to learn about the workings
of the government. Id.
281. See Serono Lab., Inc. v. Shalala, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1999) (holding that the FDA must
remove the defendant drug company's trade secrets from its administrative record before
making the record available to plaintiff drug company); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850
S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tex. 1993) (the FDA has a compelling public interest to redact patient and
reporter names and addresses from adverse reaction reports requested by a private citizen as
part of litigation against a drug company).
282. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 44.
283. See Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources [1989] 61 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 79-70
(S.C.C.).
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or negotiations of a third party not requesting the disclosure.2"4 Similar to the United
States, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to show the confidential information,
"has the necessary quality ... namely, it must not be something which is public property
and public knowledge." ' 5
The Ministry of National Health and Welfare has broad power to make regulations
prescribing standards ... or other property of any article of food, drug, cosmetic or
device"28 6 or to prohibit drug imports as "necessary for the protection of the public in
relation to the safety and quality of any such drug 2 s7 To comply with the trade secret
provisions in NAFTA and TRIPS, the Minister was given authority to issue regulations
limiting a generic drug applicant's right to cross-reference previously submitted safety
and effectiveness data.2"8 Canada's obligations to protect trade secrets submitted to the
Ministry are embodied in Food and Drug Regulation C.08.004.1. 9 A holding period is
triggered if the Minister examines and relies on data previously filed by an innovative
drug maker, in support of a generic drug maker's application for a notice of compli-
ance.29 In these cases, the generic drug maker's notice of compliance will not be issued
until five years after the innovative drug maker's notice of compliance was issued.29'
Before the NAFTA and TRIPS agreements, generic drug makers were granted access to
the safety and effectiveness data submitted by innovative drug makers.292
Similar to the protections afforded by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), the rights of innovative drug makers are protected by formally linking the
regulatory approval of generic drugs to previously patented drugs. The patentee may
submit a "patent list" of all patents that contain a claim to the medicine itself or the
use of the medicine.293 Generic drug makers wishing to market a new drug must declare
they accept that a Notice of Compliance will not issue until the patents on the list expire,
284. See Access to Information Act, R.S.C., ch. A-I, §20(1)(a-d) (1983) (Can.) (visited Jan. 10,
2000), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/A/A-t.txt.
285. Lac Minerals Ltd, 61 D.L.R. at 20 (citing Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Engineering
Co. Ltd. 11948] 65 R.P.C. 203, 215 (Eng. C.A.)).
286. Canadian Food and Drug Act, R.S.C., ch. F-27, § 30(1) (1985) (Can.) (visited Jan. 11, 2000),
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/F/F-27.txt.
287. Id. § 30(2).
288. "[T]he Governor in Council may make such regulations as the Governor... deems necessary
for the purpose of implementing, in relation to drugs, Article 1711 of the [NAFTA] or [Art.
39(3)] of the [TRIPS] [a]greement... Id. § 30(3).
289. See Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870, §C.08.004.1 (1995) (Can.), available in LEXIS,
Consolidated Regulations of Canada File.
290. Id. §C.08.004.1(1).
291. Id. The holding period, however, only applies to data filed by the innovative drug maker on
or before lan. 1, 1994. Id. §C.08.004.1(3).
292. See, e.g., Cyanamid Canada Inc. v. Minister of Nat'l Health & Welfare 11992] 45 C.P.R. (3d)
390, 393-94 & 404 (F.C.A.); Glaxo Canada, Inc. v. Ministry of Nat'l Hcalth & Welfare [1992]
41 C.P.R. (3d) 179, 185-186 (F.C.T.D.).
293. See Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133 §§4(1-2) (1993)
(Can.) (visited Mar. 4, 2000), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/FTP/EN/Regs/Chap/P/P-4/SOR93-
133.txt [hereinafter Patented Medicines]. A medicine is defined as "a substance intended or
capable of being used for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of a disease,
disorder or abnormal physical state, or the symptoms thereof.' Id. § 2.
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or alternatively, allege that the patents are not infringed or are not valid.294 A patentee
disputing the allegation has forty-five days to apply for a court order to prohibit the
Minister from issuing a Notice of Compliance. 95 Giving the Minister notice that an
application for a court order has been filed starts a twenty-four-month hold on the
issuance of a Notice of Compliance to the generic drug maker, unless the court dismisses
the application, the application is withdrawn, the patent expires or is proven invalid,
or no claim of the medicine or its use would be infringed.29 6 Innovative drug makers
always dispute an allegation because of the value in delaying the market appearance of
a competitive generic drug by at least two years.
97
b. Judicial Interpretations.
An important issue is under what conditions the Minister of Health may invoke the
five-year holding period to protect an innovative drug maker. As noted above, invoking
the holding period largely depends on whether the Minister decides to examine and rely
on prior information presented by innovative drug makers in support of a generic drug
maker's application for a Notice of Compliance. The scope of the Minister's discretion
is clarified in Bayer, where the innovative drug maker argued that the trial court inter-
preted a subsection of the Food and Drug Regulations in violation of the trade secret
protections agreed to under Article 1711 of NAFTA.2 98 Bayer asserted that Article 1711(6)
entitled innovative drug makers to five years of protection whenever a generic drug man-
ufacturer filed an abbreviated new drug submission under subsection C.08.004.1. Bayer
reasoned that the Minister of Health "must implicitly be examining and relying upon
the confidential information filed by the [innovator's New Drug Submission]... ,299
The court of appeals, however, rejected Bayer's argument, ruling that nothing in
Article 1711 of NAFTA prohibits a generic manufacturer from demonstrating safety and
effectiveness by showing that the product is the pharmaceutical and bioequivalent of the
innovator's product. "If the generic manufacturer is able to do so solely by comparing
its product with the innovator's product which is being publicly marketed, the Minister
will not have to examine or rely upon confidential information filed as part of the inno-
vator's [New Drug Submission] "'30 ' The five-year market protection for the innovator
applies only if the Minister chooses to examine and rely on the information filed by the
innovator.
294. Id. § 5(1); Canadian Patent Act, supra note 160, § 55.2(4) (giving the Governor in Council
the right to make regulations to prevent infringement of a patent).
295. See Patented Medicines, supra note 293, § 6(1).
296. Id. §7(1)(e). In 1998, the holding period was reduced from thirty months amid calls by
opposition parties and provincial governments to repeal the entire regulation. See CDMA
Calls on Prime Minister to Fire Industry Minister John Manley; Actions on Patented Medicines
Regulations Show Minister Is Putting Interests of Foreign Drug Lobby Before Those of Canadians,
CANADA NEWS WIRE LTD., Mar. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, Canadian Publications File.
297. See McMahon, supra note 7, at 45.
298. See Bayer Inc. v. Canada (1999), 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, 297 (F.C.A.).
299. Id. at 295.
300. Id. at 296.
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The court found that Bayer's interpretation would read out the option given to the
Minister as to whether or not to examine and rely on the confidential information filed
by the innovator. Critical to the court's interpretation was the Statements in the Regu-
latory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying C.08.004.1. 30 ' The court ruled that the
government's policy was to give generic drug makers the option of supplying additional
information so as to avoid having the Minister rely on confidential information supplied
by the innovator and then imposing the holding period. 3°2 The court found this not at
variance with NAFTA Article 1711 because safety and effectiveness could be established
on the basis of bioequivalence or bioavailability.
' 30 3
It is questionable whether this interpretation of C.08.004.1 complies with NAFTAs
overall objective of requiring "honest commercial practice" in the use of trade secrets
submitted to government agencies. An innovative drug maker spends considerable time
and money collecting pre-clinical and clinic safety and efficacy data to gain approval for
a new drug.3° As recognized in the United States by passing the Waxman-Hatch Act, this
gives rise to "front-end distortion,' reducing the effective term of patent protection due
the delay between patenting a drug and its approval by the FDA.30 5 According to Bayer,
however, the day after the innovative drug maker gets approval, a generic drug maker
may submit an accelerated new drug application and receive approval to market the same
drug solely by showing bioequivalence. Judge Evans of the trial division suggested that
C.08.004.1 may provide an innovative drug owner with additional market protection for
a patented drug that is about to expire. 316 But it is totally within the Minister's discretion
to rely on something other than bioequivalence data provided by the generic drug maker
seeking to market a drug previously protected by patent, but not for an unpatented
drug, as in Bayer. It is worth noting that the above-mentioned sections of NAFTA do not
restrict the protective five-year holding period to patented inventions only.307 Trade secret
protection is thus solely within the discretion of the Minister of Health, and unlikely
to provide innovative drug makers assurance of preventing "front-end distortion" of the
period of protection for patented drugs, and no protection for unpatented drugs.
301. "If the manufacturer wishes to supply the required [safety and efficacy] information
directly ... the manufacturer will avoid the application of this provision" Id. at 297.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 298. But the court seems to have ignored Article 1711(6)'s requirement that approval
based on bioequivalence or bioavailability is subject to the provision that no one may rely
on trade secret data in support of an application for five years after approval was granted to
the person that produced the data.
304. The trial court noted that Bayer, as part of its new drug submission, provided "366 volumes
of description, test data and other information, and includes the results of clinical tests
conducted over 8 years and involving 2,200 patients." Bayer Inc. v. Canada (1998), 84 C.P.R.
(3d) 129, 133 (F.C.T.D.)
305. See discussion, supra Part III.B.3.
306. See Bayer, supra note 304, 84 C.P.R. at 142.
307. This also raises doubts as to whether the Waxman-Hatch Act provides the protections agreed
to in Article 1711 of NAFTA or Article 39 of the TRIPS agreement, since § 156 addresses
patent term restoration, not trade secret protection. See Patent Act, supra note 150, § 156.
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V. Trademark Law.
A. THE PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS.
1. NA F TA.
Trademarks are broadly defined as "any sign ... capable of distinguishing the goods
or services of one person from those of another...."308 The scope of protection applies
where there is a likelihood of confusion in the use of "identical or similar signs for goods
or services ... identical or similar to those goods or services" for which a trade-mark
is registered. 09 NAFTA incorporates protections to well-known trademarks afforded by
article 6bis of the Paris Convention, with the expansion of the Convention to cover
services.31 ° To determine whether a trademark is well-known "account shall be taken
of the knowledge ... in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge ...
obtained as a result of promotion of the trademark." '' The parties, however, may not
"require that the reputation of the trademark extend beyond the scope of the public that
normally deals with the relevant goods or services."312
2. TRIPS.
TRIPS has nearly identical language to NAFTA defining eligible trademark mate-
rial.3 13 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention is also incorporated into protections for
well-known trademarks, with expanded protection to cover services." 4 A determination
of well-known is assessed "in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge ...
obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark. 3" TRIPS, however, then goes
beyond NAFTA by providing broader protections to well-known marks than NAFTA,
subject to proof of a connection with the registered trademark and a likelihood of dam-
age. Article 6bis is applied "to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect
of which a trademark is registered . . . " (emphasis added). 3 16 Protection is provided so
long as the use "would indicate a connection between those goods and services and the
308. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1708(1). There are doubts that this definition could serve as a
unambiguous legal standard. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 30.
309. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1708(2). Because NAFTA fails to define likelihood of confusion or
the degree to which goods and marks must be identical, each Party has broad discretion to
adopt their own definitions. See Goolsby, supra note 12, at 31.
310. Id. art. 1708(6). Article 6bis permits countries to "refuse or to cancel the registration, and
to prohibit the use, of a trademark ... considered ... to be well known in that country as
being already the mark ... entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical
or similar goods." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 823 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
311. NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1708(6).
312. Id.
313. "Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of
one undertaking from those of other undertakings...." TRIPS, supra note 9, art. 15(1).
314. Id. art. 16(2).
315. Id.
316. Id. art. 16(3) (emphasis added).
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owner of the registered trademark . "..." Also, TRIPS requires that "the interests of the
owner ... are likely to be damaged by such use."3 8
3. United States.
a. Statutory Law.
Unlike patents and copyright law deriving from federal regulations, trademark law
comes from the common-law torts of misappropriation and deception. 9 Federal trade-
mark law is embodied in the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act).3" The Lanham
Act provides a federal cause of action for deceptive or misleading uses of a mark in
commerce, protects against state interference or legislation, and serves to prevent unfair
competition. 1 The mark owner has a civil action when a likelihood of confusion is
created due to the use of an imitation or copy of a mark,322 or a mark is used to falsely
designate the origin or description of goods.323
The Lanham Act also "provide[s] rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and
conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into
between the United States and foreign nations."32 4 Any foreigner whose country has a
treaty with the United States relating to the protection of trademarks or preventing unfair
competition is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act, "to the extent necessary
to give effect to any provision of such ... treaty . .. "325 The subject matter of trade-
mark protection extends to "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof... used by a person, or ... which a person has a bonafide intention to use in
commerce ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods .. . from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods .... 326 For goods, a mark
is used in commerce when "it is placed ... on the goods or their containers ... and
the goods are sold or transported in commerce...."327 For services, used in commerce
means "used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are ren-
dered in commerce, or ... in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign




318. Id. In comparison, NAFTA has no such requirement.
319. See Merges, supra note 30, at 525 (overview of trademark theory).
320. See 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127 (1994) [hereinafter Lanham Act].
321. Id. § 1127.
322. Id. § 1114(l).
323. Id. § 1125(a).
324. Id. § 1127.
325. Id. § 1126(b).




The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (Dilution Act) was signed into federal law in
1996, adding dilution as a new basis for infringement. 29 Dilution is defined as "lessening
"330of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services ... -33
The Dilution Act prevents uses that may blur the distinctiveness or tarnish the image of
a mark regardless of a likelihood of confusion or competition between the mark holder
and infringer.33 ' Among several factors to decide if a mark is famous are: "inherent or
acquired distinctiveness," "duration and extent of use" and "degree of recognition ... in
the trading areas and channels of trade used" by the owner and the infringer.332 Congress
intended the Dilution Act to make the Lanham Act consistent with the United States'
obligation under the TRIPS agreement by providing a cause of action for the dilution
of famous marks.3 33 The Committee on the Judiciary recommended that the Lanham




Courts have long struggled with trying to decide the extent to which the Lanham Act
incorporates provisions from foreign treaties and agreements. 3 5 The Second Circuit in
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co. held that a U.S. company could not sue a Canadian
company for unfair competition when the latter sold feminine underwear bearing the
plaintiff's mark.3 6 The court reasoned that Section 1126(b) of the Lanham Act and
the Paris Convention only provides national treatment and, therefore, a U.S. company
could not hold a foreign company liable for a U.S. trademark violation occurring in
a foreign country.3 37 In contrast, on reviewing Vanity Fair Mills, subsequent cases, and
legislative history, the court in General Motors decided that the Lanham Act incorporated
the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention governing trademarks. 338 Because the
Paris Convention provides a broad prohibition against unfair competition, the court held
329. Id. § 1125(c) (first introduced as Pub. L. No. 104-98, 190 Stat. 985 (1995)) [hereinafter
Dilution Act].
330. Id. § 1127.
331. Id.; see Susan L. Serad, Comment, One Year After Dilution's Entry into Federal Trademark
Law, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 221 (1997) (legislative history of the Dilution Act).
332. Lanham Act, supra note 320, § 1125(c)(1).
333. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029 (report from
the Committee on the Judiciary).
334. See H.R. REP. No. 106-250, at 1-2 (1999), available at 1999 WL 528534.
335. See General Motors Corp. v. Lopez, 948 F. Supp. 656, 687-89 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (summariz-
ing cases and legislative history interpreting international obligations incorporated into the
Lanham Act).
336. See 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956).
337. Id. The court distinguished the United States Supreme Court's holding in Steele, that the
Lanham Act applied to prevent the extraterritorial activities of a U.S. citizen who obtained
the Mexican registration of the Bulova mark and then sold goods bearing the mark in the
U.S. Id. (commenting on Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952)). Unlike Steele,
the court in Vanity Fair found no substantial effect on foreign or interstate commerce in the
United States. Id.; see 234 F.2d, supra note 336, at 642.
338. See General Motors, 948 F. Supp. at 689.
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that General Motors had established a valid claim for the theft of their trade secrets and
their use by Volkswagen outside of the United States.
339
Courts have been reluctant to prevent domestic citizens from trading on the good-
will of a well-known foreign trademark, despite the provisions in NAFTA and TRIPS
incorporating article 6bis of the Paris Convention. For example, in Buti, the domestic
plaintiffs sought to clarify their right to open a restaurant in the United States under
the mark "Fashion Caf6' 34 ° The district court rejected the defendant's argument that,
although they were operating a restaurant using this mark in Italy, their advertising in
the United States was enough to constitute use of a mark in a service as defined in
section 1127 of the Lanham Act.34' The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this case
presented the mirror image of the situation in Vanity Fair.34 2 As in Vanity Fair, a key
issue was whether the defendant had conducted the affairs of their restaurant to substan-
tially affect either interstate or foreign commerce.34 3 The court noted that the defendant's
restaurant services in Italy involved no trade between the United States and Italy, there
was no constitutional authority for the United States to regulate the restaurant, and its
advertising was insufficient to constitute use in commerce.
344
Two decisions by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) are especially ger-
mane to defining the extent of protection afforded to Canadian-registered trademarks. In
Mother's Restaurants Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen Inc., the owner of several restaurants
operating in Canada under the mark "Mother's Pizza Parlour," opposed the registration
of "Mother's Other Kitchen" as a mark in the United States. 345 Mother's Restaurants
argued that they had created goodwill in the United States by radio advertisements reach-
ing parts of the United States, and by distributing promotional materials along tourist
routes frequented by Americans visiting Canada. 346 The TTAB rejected the argument,
holding that priority in a mark is not created through "prior use and advertising of
a mark in connection with goods or services marketed in a foreign country (whether
said advertising occurs inside or outside the United States) ... against one who, in
good faith, has adopted the same or similar mark ... in the United States prior to the
foreigner's first use of the mark ... in the United States.' 347 The TTAB acknowledged
339. Article l0bis of the Paris Convention prohibits "[any act of competition contrary to honest
practices" in particular acts like to create confusion, false allegations, or misleading allega-
tions. Paris Convention, supra note 310. In addition, the court stated that "Congress has
the power to regulate even entirely foreign commerce where it has a substantial effect on
commerce between the states or between the United States and foreign countries." General
Motors, 948 E Supp. at 690.
340. See Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1998).
341. Id. at 101. Although the defendant Impressa Perosa filed several counterclaims, dilution of a
famous mark under § 1125(c) of the Lanham Act was not among them. Id.
342. Id. at 102.
343. Id. at 103.
344. Id. at 103.
345. See 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046 (T.T.A.B. 1983), available in 1983 TTAB LEXIS 117.
346. Id. at 1047-48.
347. Id. at 1048.
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that an exception maybe allowed for a foreign famous mark as done in Vaudable v.
Montmartre, Inc.34 8 although that was not the situation in the present case.
34 9
More recently, in Linville v. Rivard, the TTAB found that Rivard's radio, television,
and newspaper ads reaching the United States, and promotional material distributed
inside the United States, did not constitute use sufficient to allow a Canadian hair salon
to prevent cancellation of "ULTRACUTS" as a registered mark in the United States.
350
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the Board's decision, noting that
Rivard's trips to the United States to investigate establishing hair dressing and beauty
salons in the United States was insufficient to show an intent to use the mark in com-




The Federal rights are grounded in the Trademark Act. 3 2 A trademark "is used
by a person for ... distinguishing . . . wares or services manufactured, sold, leased,
hired or performed by him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or per-
formed by others....-353 Infringement occurs if a "person not entitled to [the mark's]
use ... sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing
trademark... -"' There could be confusion between trademarks, even if the infringing
mark is associated with wares or services not of the same general class. 355 The Canadian
Trademark Act also provides a federal cause of action against unfair competition,
including the common law of passing off: "direct[ing] public attention to his wares,
services or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause confusion. ... 356
A mark is deemed to be adopted by its owner when used or made known in Canada,
or when a registration is filed. 357 Use in association with goods occurs when wares
348. 193 N.Y.S. 2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
349. Id. In Vaudable, the owner of Maxim's restaurant in Paris was granted a permanent injunction
against using their mark as the name of restaurant in New York. See Vaudable, supra note
348, at 334. In finding Maxim's to be a famous mark in the United States, the court pointed
to the mark's renown by a particular class of up-scale restaurant goers in New York, the
registration of "Maxim's" as a mark in the United States, and the actual sale of goods and
services bearing the mark in the United States. Id. The court cited both the prevention of
confusion and dilution of the mark as grounds for granting relief to the plaintiff. Id. at 335.
350. See 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1731, 1735-1737 (TTAB 1997), available in 1996 TTAB LEXIS 32.
351. See Rivard v. Linville, 133 F.3d 1446, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
352. See Trademark Act, R.S.C., ch. T-13, § 1 (1985) (Can.) (as amended) [hereinafter Canadian
Trademark Act] (visited Jan. 11, 2000), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/STABLE/EN/Laws/Chap/T
T- 13.html.
353. Id. § 2.
354. Id. § 20.
355. Id. §§ 6(1-4).
356. Id. § 7(b). Unfair competition may also arise from: "false or misleading statement[s] ...
pass[ing] off other wares or services as and for those ordered or requested ... ; make use ...
of any description that is false ... ; or ... any other practice contrary to honest industrial
or commercial [use]" Id. §§ 7(a, c-e).
357. Id. § 3.
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or packaging are marked such that the person possessing the goods has notice of the
association.35 8 For services, a mark is used when "used or displayed in the performance
or advertising of those services"3 59
The evidence necessary to establish a famous foreign mark is addressed within the
definition of "made known in Canada." A mark is made known if used by a person
"in a country of the Union, other than Canada, in association with wares or services,
and ... distributed in ... or advertised in ... any printed publication circulated in
Canada ... or radio broadcasts ordinarily received in Canada ... and it has become
well-known in Canada by reason of the distribution or advertising.'' 36" A "country of
the union" refers to "any country that is a member of the Union for the protection of
Industrial Property constituted under the [Paris] Convention, or any WTO member."36'
Thus, a foreign mark not in distribution in Canada may be still given protection if it has
become well-known through advertising. The meaning of "well-known:' however, is not
defined in the Canadian Trademark Act. 362 This has important consequences, because the
extent to which a trademark has become known is a factor in deciding if two trademarks
are confusing.3 13 Analogous to dilution in the United States, a registered trademark may
not be used by another person in a manner likely to depreciate the value of goodwill
associated with the mark.
64
b. Judicial Interpretations.
Traditionally, courts and the trademark board required a foreign mark to be known
in every part or a substantial part of Canada before being allowed registration or to
bring an opposition.3 6' This may violate NAFTA and TRIPS, which require protection
of a trademark so long as there is notoriety within the relevant sector of the public.3
66
Broader protection has been afforded, however, to foreign marks in a passing off cause
of action.
358. Id. § 4(1).
359. Id. § 4(2).
360. Id. §§ 5(a-b).
361. Id. §2.
362. See Hugues G. Richard, Protecting Intellectual Property in a World Getting Smaller: The Treat-
ment of Well-Known Trade-Marks in Canada (visited Sept. 16, 1999), http://www.robic.ca.
publications.236.html.
363. Id.; see Canadian Trademark Act, supra note 352, § 6(5).
364. See Canadian Trademark Act, supra note 352, § 22(1).
365. See Wian Enter. Inc. v. Mady [1965] 46 C.P.R. 147, 169-70 (E.C.C.) (a foreign trade mark
cannot be regarded as well known in Canada if knowledge of it is restricted to only a local
area); E & I Gallo Winery v. Andres Wines Ltd. [19741 14 C.P.R.2d 204, 212-13 (F.C.T.D)
(adopting and interpreting Wian to mean that a mark must be well known across Canada
among potential users or dealers in or users of the goods); Valle's Steak House v. Tessier
[19801 49 C.P.R.2d 218, 226 (F.C.T.D.) (interpreting Wian to mean that to be well known,
a mark must be known in "a substantial part" of the country); Redsand Inc. v. Dylex Ltd.
[1997], 74 C.P.R.3d 373, 385 (F.C.T.D.) (following Wian, and holding that to be well known
through advertising the foreign mark must be "substantial enough to have a noticeable impact
in the Canadian market" and be "well known" over a substantial area of Canada).
366. See discussion, supra Parts V.A.1-2.
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For example, Orkin brought a common-law passing off action against Pestco, who
listed itself in the business and yellow pages under the name of Orkin, and used a
likeness of the Orkin logo.367 Orkin was granted an injunction even though it did no
business in Canada.368 The court rejected Pestco's argument that Orkin did not have any
goodwill in Canada, noting that Orkin had established a base of Canadian customers
owning property in the United States, and intended to extend its business into Canada.
69
Pestco's bad faith in the appropriation of Orkin's mark also acted in Orkin's favor. Justice
Morden wrote, "[tlhe specter of Orkin having a monopoly in Ontario . .. even though
now it is not now carrying on business here, is considerably less troubling than the
deceptive use of its name and symbol by another."37
More recently, a court rejected the argument that a foreign company not doing
business in Canada has to be well known across Canada before they have a federal
passing off cause of action against a Canadian company.37" ' In an effort to obstruct the
entry of the U.S. company, Enterprise Rent-a-Car Company (Enterprise), the owner of a
Canadian car rental company (Singer), changed the company's name to "Enterprise Car
and Truck Rentals Ltd.," one year before Enterprise opened a branch in Canada.372 Singer
argued that under section 5 of the Canadian Trademark Act, Enterprise had to show
that they were well known in Canada before they could bring a passing-off action. 373
The trial court held that "compliance with [§]5 is not a prerequisite to a passing-off
action under [§ ]7(b)' 3 74 In the court's view, the key issue in a passing off claim was
that the mark owner had created sufficient local goodwill in the country to be protected
by the law.371 Similar to Orkin, the court found that Enterprise, while not necessar-
ily famous, had established goodwill by showing the existence of Canadian customers
across the country, maintaining a 1-800 phone number accessible to Canadians, using
Canadian travel agents to make reservations, and showing an intent to open its business
in Canada.
376
367. See Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Pestco of Canada Ltd. [ 1985] 5 C.P.R.3d 433, 438-439
(Ont. C.A.).
368. Id. at 454 (affirming the trial judge's awarding of an injunction to prevent Pestco's further
misappropriation of the Orkin's mark).
369. Id. at 444.
370. Id. at 448.
371. See Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. Singer [1996], 66 C.P.R.3d 453, 458 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd [1998]
79 C.P.R.3d 45 (F.C.A.).
372. See id. at 454.
373. Id. at 478.
374. Id. at 480. In affirming the trial court's holding, the appellate court noted that as deeming
clauses, "[s]ections 3, 4, and 5 ... did not prescribe substantive rules governing the acqui-
sition and use of trademarks[,]" and are only applied to "sections of the Act where those
phrases [are] used." 79 C.P.R.3d at 45-46.
375. See supra note 379, at 479. The three elements to establish the prima facie case for passing off
are: the plaintiff established goodwill in the mind public; the defendant misrepresented the
public; and the plaintiff had or is likely to have damages as result of the misrepresentation.
Id. at 474.
376. Id. at 476-77.
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There may be less protection, however, where there is confusion related to wares
or services from different classes.3 77 For example, the Registrar of Trademarks rejected
United Artist's opposition and allowed Pink Panther Beauty Corp. to register "Pink
Panther."378 The Registrar found that although United Artists had a registered mark in
the words "Pink Panther," it was not a well-known mark in Canada and because the
mark was used on dissimilar products, there was no likelihood of confusion. 79 Based on
additional evidence presented by United Artists, the trial court overturned the Registrar,
holding that "Pink Panther" was widely known in Canada, and there was a likelihood
of confusion in the mind of Canadian consumers.
3 10
The court of appeals reversed, holding that although famous and distinctive, there
was no likelihood of confusion between the marks because of the different nature of
the products sold by the two companies (i.e., beauty supplies versus movies), and the
location of sales (beauty parlors versus theaters or video stores). 8' Previous case law
supported the court's holding that a mark's fame was not so important as to outweigh
the large difference in the nature of the wares or trade sold.382 To find otherwise, in the
majority's view, would extend "protection to every field of endeavor imaginable. There
would be no area that Hollywood's marketing machine would not control. Just because
they are well-known, the whole world is not barred forever from using words found in
the title of a Hollywood film to market unrelated goods.'383
The dissent noted that the beauty salon choose "Pink Panther" as its mark precisely
because it was well known in Canada.384 The dissent asserted that there was case law
supporting the view that trademarks should be protected in spite of dissimilar settings. 8
In addition, the majority's holding may conflict with Article 16(3) of TRIPS, which
requires protecting marks beyond the class of goods the trademark is associated with, so
long as use would indicate a connection with the mark owner's goods or services, and
there is a likelihood of damages. This potential conflict with TRIPS is now unlikely to
be addressed by Canada's Supreme Court.
38 6
377. See United Artists Corp. v. Pink Panther Beauty Corp. t19901 34 C.P.R.3d 135 (T.M.O.B.),
rev'd [1996] 67 C.P.R.3d 216 (F.C.T.D.); rev'd [1998] 80 C.P.R.3d 247, leave to appeal to
Supreme Court of Canada granted, [1999] 82 C.P.R.3d vi (S.C.C.).
378. See 34 C.P.R.3d at 139-140.
379. The only acceptable evidence offered by United Artists was distribution revenues of the
movie The Pink Panther from the mid-60s. The Registrar found this insufficient to establish
nonabandonment of the mark or of the mark being well known to a significant extent in
Canada. See 34 C.P.R.3d at 139.
380. See 67 C.P.R.3d at 226.
381. See 80 C.P.R.3d at 269.
382. Id. at 265-67.
383. Id. at 270.
384. Id. at 271.
385. Id. at 274.
386. See Ed Hore, Intellectual Property S.C.C. to Hear 2 Patent Cases, THE LAWYERS WEEKLY, Aug.
13, 1999 (although the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to hear United Artists, the
parties are now likely to settle).
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VI. Summary, Analysis, and Conclusions.
A. DISPARITIES BETWEEN CANADIAN AND U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION AND THE HARMONIZING EFFECT OF NAFTA OR TRIPS.
1. Copyright Law.
Canada's revision of its laws regarding database protection provides a good exam-
ple of how international agreements like NAFTA can harmonize the laws between two
parties. In Tele-Direct, the Supreme Court of Canada was strongly influenced by the
wording of Article 1705(1) in NAFTA and the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of
Section 103 of the Copyright Act in Feist. This influence proceeded from the fact that
Canada amended its copyright law to include database compilations specifically for the
purpose of implementing NAFTA. Consequently, the "sweat of the brow" rationale for
database protection was rejected in favor of a creativity requirement.
NAFTA's influence on Canada's database protection also illustrates the inability of
international agreements to anticipate changing intellectual protections necessitated by
technological advances. Since the NAFTA agreement was negotiated in the early 1990s,
advances in computer and telecommunication technology have increased the value of
databases and the need to prevent its piracy. Although the United States may enact laws
to increase the protection given to American database owners, NAFTA or TRIPS provides
no obligation for Canada to do the same. Rejecting the "sweat of the brow" rationale has
left Canadian courts with less discretion to protect database owners against piracy under
the Canadian Copyright Act. As a developed country, the Canadian government will
likely face a strong enough domestic lobby to prompt strengthening its copyright laws in
this regard. But less developed nations maybe less inclined to provide more protection
than that agreed to under NAFTA or TRIPS.
Canada's levy and royalty system for sound recordings shows how the "cultural
industries exception" and reciprocity principles allowed under NAFTA can produce dis-
parate treatments of intellectual property owners from different parties. Only Canadian
artists benefit from the levy placed on recording media that undoubtedly is also used
for copying sound recordings created and produced by U.S. artists. In addition, because
the United States does not charge a levy for analog recording media and limits the
scope of covered digital media, Canada can point to the national reciprocity provision
for sound recordings allowed under both NAFTA and TRIPS as grounds for disparate
treatment. Canada's disparate treatment on the grounds of promoting a culture industry
is weakened, however, by its signing of TRIPS, which does not allow a cultural industries
exception.
Similarly, NAFTA and TRIPS exempt parties from following the provisions of article
6bis of the Berne Convention and, consequently, an artist's moral rights are significantly
different in Canada and America. In the United States, moral rights are strictly limited
to visual art, and even then the artist's rights are exceedingly difficult to enforce. In
contrast, moral rights are broadly accepted by Canadian courts, and provides important
grounds for damage remedies, especially when there is no commercial loss associated
with copyright infringement.
The failure of NAFTA or TRIPS to consider defenses to copyright infringement
also produces disparate intellectual property protection in the two countries. In the
United States, fair use as an exception to copyright infringement is given broad latitude.
Consequently, actions such as parody are allowed, even though parody is not explicitly
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listed in the Copyright Act as fair use. In contrast, in Canada, fair dealing as an exception
to infringement is limited to only those actions listed in the Canadian Copyright Act.
As a result, because it is not listed, parody is not allowed as a fair dealing exception to
copyright infringement in Canada.
2. Patent Law.
Although the definitions of a patentable invention are very similar in both countries,
Canada refused to allow the patenting of higher life forms, like the onco-mouse, while
the United States treats life forms as any other patentable invention. But the United
States' and Canada's different treatment of life forms as patentable subject matter illus-
trates more the unpredictable nature of courts in interpreting intellectual property laws,
than the inability of NAFTA and TRIPS to harmonize patent laws. It is true that NAFTA
and TRIPS allow a broad gamut of exclusions on moral grounds. However, these were
not the basis used by a Canadian court to reject the onco-mouse as a patentable inven-
tion. Rather, the court cited the failure to distinguish between human intervention and
laws of nature, and the lack of reproducibility of the onco-gene's expression, as grounds
for rejecting the patent. Subsequent advances in genetic engineering, however, may obvi-
ate these as valid grounds for rejecting life forms as patentable inventions, forcing the
Canadian judiciary to revisit this issue in the near future.
Just as disallowing the patentability of life forms has little effect on Canada's econ-
omy, compulsory licensing or the imposition of price guidelines does little to hamper
a relatively small innovative drug industry in Canada. Maintaining low drug prices by
these measures also reduces the cost of Canada's government-run health care programs
and endears the current political party to the public. The NAFTA and TRIPS agreements
did help ending compulsory licensing and extend the term of protection of patented
drugs in Canada. It is questionable, however, whether "price guidelines" imposed and
enforced by a government board do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploita-
tion of a patented drug and prejudice the patentee's legitimate interests, in violation of
NAFTA and TRIPS.
In the United States, a more acceptable but less effective means to contain the costs
of drugs is to allow the generic drug industry a head start in preparing to compete
against innovative drug makers. It remains to be seen how much leeway U.S. courts
will give to the activities of generic drug makers on the grounds of being reasonably
related to developing information for submission to the FDA. Canadian courts have
expressed great willingness to give generic drug makers opportunities beyond preparing
to compete, such as entering supply agreements and reformulating drug doses.
3. Trade Secret Law.
To assure honest commercial practices, both NAFTA and TRIPS require the protec-
tion of innovative drug makers against generic drug makers who submit an abbreviated
new drug submission, where the confidential test data of the innovative drug maker is
relied on. Unfortunately, neither agreement defines the scope of "reliance.' In Canada,
reliance is left totally to the discretion of the Minister of Health. The holding in Bayer
suggests that the Minister will not be inclined to rely on the confidential data of innova-
tive drug makers when generic drug makers submit an accelerated new drug application.
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As a result, there is no guarantee of trade secret protections as required under NAFTA
or TRIPS.
In the United States, the protections given to confidential pharmaceutical data sub-
mitted to the FDA also are questionable. The Waxman-Hatch Act does provide an addi-
tional term of protection for patented drugs when a generic drug maker submits an
accelerated new drug application. The holding period required under NAFTA and TRIPS
to protect trade secrets, however, is not restricted to patented drugs. Therefore, the scope
of trade secret protections required under NAFTA and TRIPS are not fully addressed by
the Waxman-Hatch Act.
Neither the NAFTA nor the TRIPS agreements address when confidential infor-
mation may be released to the public, other than the two nebulous exceptions: where
necessary to protect the public or where steps are taken to ensure unfair commercial
use. The extent to which confidential information is released from agencies like the FDA,
either on their own discretion or under the pressure of special interest groups, can be
highly damaging to innovative drug makers. It remains up to innovative drug companies
to curtail such activities by suing agencies that release confidential information. NAFTA
and TRIPS do not clarify or harmonize the conditions under which a party's discloser
of trade secrets does not violate these agreements.
' 4. Trademark Law.
Although NAFTA and TRIPS have motivated changes in both American and
Canadian trademark law, disparities still exist between the protections offered by the
two countries. A key issue is each country's interpretation of what article 6bis of the
Paris Convention, incorporated into both NAFTA and TRIPS, requires. The language of
article 6bis suggests a goal of preventing the use of marks considered well-known in a
foreign country for similar or identical goods. The United States purports to comply
with its obligations under TRIPS by passing the Dilution Act. Courts and the Trademark
Board have required actual use of a well-known foreign mark in the United States before
allowing protection of the mark-foreign use plus advertising in the United States not
being enough to constitute use within the meaning of the Lanham Act. It remains to
be seen whether passage of the Dilution Act will expand the U.S.'s protection of foreign
marks.
In comparison, Canadian courts have allowed advertising as sufficient grounds to
establish goodwill in Canada for the purpose of a foreign mark holder bringing a federal
passing off cause of action against a domestic infringer. But registration or opposition
requires a showing of fame over a substantial part of Canada. TRIPS has extended the
protection of famous marks to uses not similar to those for which the mark is registered,
so long as a connection would be indicated and the mark owners interests would be
damaged. The Pink Panther holding suggests that Canadian courts still require proof of
a likelihood of confusion, even for famous marks.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS.
The disparities between intellectual property protections between America and
Canada exemplifies several areas of contention that developed (or more properly,
intellectual property exporting) and developing (or more properly, intellectual property
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importing) nations face when negotiating future agreements. Developed nations want
protections explicit enough to assure businesses that their intellectual property rights are
legally enforceable within each party's judicial system. Developing nations want built-in
discretionary exceptions so they can ensure the preservation of their culture identity and
control the costs of certain critical products, such as drugs. Provisions left undefined
tend to work to the benefit of developing nations because the provision can then be
interpreted in a manner that minimizes the intellectual rights that must be provided to
foreign businesses.
Canada's adoption of the creativity requirement for database protection, ending
compulsory licensing, and extending the period of patent protection for drugs are impor-
tant rights benefiting intellectual property owners in the United States. But NAFTA's
allowance of a cultural industry exception permits Canada to use the proceeds of a roy-
alty and levy system to benefit Canadian artists, to the exclusion of American artists.
Although compulsory licensing of patents has ended, Canada continues to control the
price of drugs and create a regulatory climate favorable to generic drug makers. Canada's
reluctance to protect famous foreign trademarks against dissimilar uses reflects a desire
to restrain the onslaught of the American "marketing machine."
The United States is also not above restricting intellectual property rights, although
usually this is done out of concerns that too large a scope of rights will deter domestic
free enterprise. For example, the United States' restrictive acknowledgment of an artist's
moral rights reflect the view that innovation will not be promoted by granting broad
rights. This may also explain why fair use is given broad latitude, despite the likelihood
that parody depreciates the value of the original work. Similarly, requiring that famous
marks be in actual use in the United States before being protected benefits businesses
wishing to use the same or a similar mark.
Despite their deficiencies, NAFTA and TRIPS have advanced the United States and
Canada towards harmonizing their intellectual property rights. As trade becomes more
global, intellectual property protections are an increasingly critical negotiating point in
trade agreements. NAFTA and TRIPS provide important lessons for improving future
agreements.
